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The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion
Leandra Lederman*
ABSTRACT: The “fraud triangle”—a theory of why people commit fraud
—is the preeminent framework for analyzing fraud in the accounting
literature. It developed out of studies of fraudsters, including inmates convicted
of embezzlement. The three components of the fraud triangle are
(1) an incentive or pressure (usually financial); (2) opportunity; and
(3) rationalization.
There is a separate, extensive legal literature on tax compliance and evasion.
The fraud triangle is largely absent from this legal literature, although tax
evasion is a type of fraud. This Article rectifies that oversight, analyzing how
using the fraud triangle as a lens can inform the legal literature on tax
compliance. In addition, the Article argues that the fraud triangle can
provide a conceptual frame that provides a place for two distinct types of tax
compliance theories discussed in the legal literature: the traditional deterrence
model and certain behavioral theories.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Every tax system faces the prospect of evasion, forcing governments
worldwide to grapple with the question of how to increase tax compliance.
There is an extensive set of literatures on this issue spanning multiple fields,
including both law and economics. The traditional economic model considers
tax evasion a type of gamble.1 The legal literature frequently references that
model and analyzes deterrence.2 In recent years, tax compliance scholarship
has also considered behavioral explanations for compliance.3

1. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1
J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324 (1972) (“The tax declaration decision is a decision under uncertainty.
. . . The taxpayer has the choice between two main strategies: (1) He may declare his actual
income. (2) He may declare less than his actual income.”).
2. For recent examples, see Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56
B.C. L. REV. 617, 622 (2015) (“Standard deterrence theory, as applied to tax compliance,
assumes that taxpayers are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility.”); Leandra
Lederman, Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, 2018 BYU L. REV. 623, 642–55
(discussing the deterrence model); and Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax Compliance:
The Use-Tax Experiment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1083, 1084 (“Traditional economic or deterrence
theories assert that the decision to comply depends on a cost-benefit or expected-utility
analysis.”).
3. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale in the European Union, 11 EUR. REV. 385,
389 (2003) (“[The article] seeks to demonstrate that intrinsic motivation in the form of ‘tax
morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax paying behaviour.”); Dan M. Kahan,
Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV.
367, 380 (2002) (“The reciprocity theory not only furnishes a convincing explanation for the
phenomenon of tax evasion; it also suggests a novel theory for combating it: the promotion
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There is also a separate accounting literature on fraud. A central concept
in the accounting literature is the fraud triangle, which has been called “[t]he
dominant framework relating to fraud . . . [,] embedded in professional
auditing standards around the world including the USA, Australia and
international audit standards.”4 The fraud triangle is a theory of why people
commit fraud.5 The “triangle” aspect of the fraud triangle reflects the fact that
the theory contains three factors.6 The fraud triangle has been applied to a
wide range of malfeasance, including student plagiarism; the Volkswagen
emissions scandal; and Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.7
Despite the preeminent role the fraud triangle theory plays within the
accounting literature on fraud, it is almost entirely absent from the extensive
legal literature on tax compliance and evasion.8 This Article both fills the gap
in the legal literature and resolves some inconsistencies in the applicable
accounting literature.
This Article is as much about the fraud triangle as it is about tax evasion.
Thus, the first two major Parts that follow this Introduction focus on the fraud
triangle itself, while the remaining two address connections between the tax
compliance literature and the fraud triangle. Part II begins with a discussion
of the fascinating history and evolution of the fraud triangle. This Part also
examines the role of experiential learning in the fraud triangle, using as an
example the experiences of Hollywood producer and sports executive Bruce
McNall, as described in his book, Fun While It Lasted. That is one of the
Article’s contributions to the fraud triangle literature.
Part III then focuses on the accounting literature on the fraud triangle.
This Part analyzes and proposes resolutions to some confusion in that
literature, including (1) the contested origins of the “fraud triangle” name,
and (2) how the theory was extended from studies of embezzlement to other
types of fraud.
Part IV of the Article turns to the tax context, exploring how each of the
triangle’s three factors can inform thinking about tax evasion. Part V then
applies the fraud triangle framework to the tax compliance literature. A major
of trust.”); Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 1095 (“One significant nonpecuniary model of tax
compliance suggests a social-norm rationale for tax-compliance decisions.”).
4. Clinton Free, Looking Through the Fraud Triangle: A Review and Call for New Directions, 23
MEDITARI ACCT. RSCH. 175, 177 (2015) (citations omitted).
5. See infra Section II.A.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9–10.
7. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Ryesky, Part Time Soldiers: Deploying Adjunct Faculty in the War Against
Student Plagiarism, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 119, 144–46 (student plagiarism); Mandy Moody,
Placing Volkswagen into the Fraud Triangle, F RAUD CONF. NEWS (June 14, 2016), https://
www.fraudconferencenews.com/home/2016/6/14/placing-volkswagen-into-the-fraud-triangle
[https://perma.cc/NEF4-Y2NB] (Volkswagen); Walter Pavlo, Bernard Madoff is the Fraud Triangle,
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/03/01/
bernard-madoff-is-the-fraud-triangle/#59ea2f346cad [https://perma.cc/VW4L-BNHB] (Bernie
Madoff); see also W. Steve Albrecht, Iconic Fraud Triangle Endures, FRAUD MAG., July–Aug. 2014, at
1, 7 (citing such examples as student cheating, exceeding a speed limit, and cheating on one’s
spouse).
8. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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contribution of this Article is that it argues that the fraud triangle can serve as
a lens that helps bridge the leading theories of tax compliance: the deterrence
model and behavioral approaches.
II. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
The fraud triangle is a three-pronged theory of why some individuals
commit occupational fraud. The triangle’s three factors have evolved
somewhat over the years, as discussed below.9 However, the current factors
are generally understood to be those described in American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) and international auditing standards:
“Fraud, whether fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets,
involves incentive or pressure to commit fraud, a perceived opportunity to do so,
and some rationalization of the act . . . .”10 The AICPA adopted these standards
in the early 2000s, in what was then called Statements on Auditing Standards
(“SAS”) No. 99.11 The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
followed suit in International Standards on Auditing (“ISA”) 240.12 Although
the accounting standards do not specifically use the phrase “fraud triangle,”
they are understood to refer to it.13
A. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE’S EMBEZZLEMENT ORIGINS
The origins of the fraud triangle lie neither with the accounting
profession nor in the twenty-first century. Instead, Donald Cressey’s work on

9. See infra Sections II.A–.B.
10. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); INT’L
AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON AUDITING 240: THE
AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO FRAUD IN AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ A1
(2009) [hereinafter ISA 240] (emphasis added).
11. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99,
17 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002). SAS No. 99 was subsequently incorporated into
AU section 316. See Pre-Clarity Statements on Auditing Standards, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCTS., https://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/sas.html [https://perma.cc/
W66H-TWBZ]. AU section 316 has since been superseded by AU-C section 240. See AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., AU-C EXHIBIT A (2013), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/
research/standards/auditattest/downloadabledocuments/au-c-exhibita.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C8PC-7FSW].
12. Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements, INT’L AUDITING
& ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD. (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter Auditor’s Responsibility], https://
www.iaasb.org/projects/auditors-responsibility-consider-fraud-audit-financial-statements [https://
perma.cc/4BNF-SZBN] (discussing revisions to ISA 240).
13. See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 7, at 6 (“[I]n 2002, the Auditing Standards Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants used the Fraud Triangle as a critical element
of ‘SAS 99: Consideration of Fraud.’”); Free, supra note 4, at 177 (“The dominant framework
relating to fraud is the so-called ‘fraud triangle,’ which is embedded in professional auditing
standards around the world including the USA (SAS No. 99), Australia (ASA 240) and
international audit standards (ISA 240).” (citations omitted)); David T. Wolfe & Dana R.
Hermanson, The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud, CPA J., Dec. 2004, at 38, 38
(“This three-pronged framework, commonly known as the ‘fraud triangle,’ has . . . . been formally
adopted by the auditing profession as part of SAS 99.”).
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embezzlement in the early 1950s is generally credited as the origin of the
theory,14 sometimes with Edwin Sutherland’s work as its antecedent.15 Cressey
developed three factors to explain why some individuals employed in
positions of trust violate that trust by absconding with the entrusted funds,
while others do not.16 Cressey’s three factors were (1) a non-shareable
pressure (generally financial); (2) a perceived opportunity to embezzle; and
(3) rationalization of the planned violation.17
Cressey began this work as a Ph.D. student of Edwin Sutherland’s at
Indiana University.18 Sutherland, who “coined the term ‘white collar crime’”
in a 1939 speech to the American Sociological Association,19 was seeking to
overcome a common understanding of crime as committed overwhelmingly
by members of the “lower class”20 and thus “caused by poverty or by personal
and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty.”21
Sutherland argued that criminality was learned behavior, rather than due to
personal characteristics. He called the process “differential association”
because he argued that criminality depends on the frequency with which the

14. See, e.g., Rasha Kassem & Andrew Higson, The New Fraud Triangle Model, 3 J. EMERGING
TRENDS ECON. & MGMT. SCIS. 191, 193 (2012) (“Cressey’s fraud theory, normally known as the
fraud triangle theory, was widely supported and used by audit professionals and standards’ setters
as a tool for detecting fraud.”); Alexander Schuchter & Michael Levi, The Fraud Triangle Revisited,
29 SEC. J. 107, 107 (2016) [hereinafter Schuchter & Levi, Revisited] (“This article revisits the
Fraud Triangle, an explanatory framework for financial fraud, developed by the American
criminologist Donald Cressey.”).
Throughout this Article, the term “embezzlement” is not used in a strictly technical
sense, but rather is used to refer to any illegal misappropriation of entrusted funds. Cf. infra note
30 (discussing how Donald Cressey addressed this issue).
15. See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 7, at 1–2 (“Two individuals who probably deserve the most
credit for the fraud [triangle] model are early criminology researchers Edwin Sutherland and
Donald Cressey.”); Jack W. Dorminey, Arron Scott Fleming, Mary-Jo Kranacher & Richard A.
Riley, Jr., Beyond the Fraud Triangle: Enhancing Deterrence of Economic Crimes, CPA J., July 2010, at 17,
18 [hereinafter Dorminey et al., Enhancing Deterrence] (“The concept of a fraud triangle dates
back to the work of Edwin Sutherland, who coined the term white-collar crime, and Donald
Cressey, who wrote Other People’s Money.”).
16. See DONALD R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF EMBEZZLEMENT 12 (1953) [hereinafter CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY].
17. Id. at 30.
18. See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 2; Ronald L. Akers & Ross L. Matsueda, Donald R. Cressey:
An Intellectual Portrait of a Criminologist, 59 SOCIO. INQUIRY 423, 424 (1989) (discussing Cressey’s
dissertation).
19. Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1, 3 (1940) [hereinafter
Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality]; see Jérémy Morales, Yves Gendron & Henri Guénin-Paracini,
The Construction of the Risky Individual and Vigilant Organization: A Genealogy of the Fraud Triangle,
39 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 170, 173 (2014).
20. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, at 1 (“The criminal statistics show
unequivocally that crime, as popularly conceived and officially measured, has a high incidence in the
lower class and a low incidence in the upper class; less than two percent of the persons committed
to prisons in a year belong to the upper class.”).
21. Id.; see also Morales et al., supra note 19, at 173 (“Sutherland showed that criminology
greatly underestimated (or even obscured) the violations of law perpetrated by persons of the
upper socioeconomic class.” (citation omitted)).
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person associates with criminal or non-criminal behavior22—an argument that
today would likely refer to the norms of the individual’s community or
workplace.23
1. Donald Cressey’s Work on Embezzlement
Cressey argued that “Sutherland’s position was confused by the fact that
he studied corporations, rather than individual white-collar criminals.”24 To
address that concern, Cressey focused his doctoral research on individuals.25
He stated, “[i]t was my impression that embezzlers are white-collar criminals
whose backgrounds are not likely to contain the social and personal pathologies
which popular notions and traditional theory ascribe to criminals.”26
In this research, which became a book, Cressey’s “objective [was] to
separate, on the basis of a causal process, the behavior of trusted persons who
violate their trust from the behavior of nonviolators.”27 In other words, he
sought an explanation for why “some persons in positions of financial trust violate
that trust, whereas other persons, or even the same person at a different time,
in identical or very similar positions do not so violate it.”28

22. See Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, at 11 (“Whether a person becomes
a criminal or not is determined largely by the comparative frequency and intimacy of his contacts
with the two types of behavior.”).
23. Cf. Cheryl Lero Jonson & Gilbert Geis, Cressey, Donald R.: Embezzlement and White-Collar
Crime, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 223, 228 (Francis T. Cullen & Pamela
Wilcox eds., 2010) (“Cressey especially applied Sutherland’s differential association theory to the
analysis and control of management fraud. He argued that management fraud could be
explained through an understanding that people are exposed to definitions both favorable and
unfavorable to the violation of law.” (citations omitted)).
24. Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 13 (1965) [hereinafter
Cressey, Respectable Criminal].
25. JOSEPH T. WELLS, OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: HOW TO PREVENT AND DETECT
ASSET MISAPPROPRIATION, CORRUPTION AND FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS 10 (1997). While a
sociology graduate student at Indiana University, Cressey took a course from Jerome Hall at the
law school, which was very unusual at the time. Donald R. Cressey, Dedication, Jerome Hall, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1384–85 (1981) [hereinafter Cressey, Jerome Hall].
26. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 13.
Cressey noted that the trust-violation crimes he studied did not all constitute “white-collar crime”
as defined by Sutherland:
As a class of crimes, trust violation cannot be considered as “white collar crime.”
Sutherland has defined that type of crime as violation of law by persons of
respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations. . . . While the
crimes of trust violators are committed in the course of their occupations, many of
the violators encountered cannot be considered as persons of high social status or
as respected persons of the community.
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 184 n.9 (citing EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949)).
27. Donald R. Cressey, Why Do Trusted Persons Commit Fraud?: A Social-Psychological Study of
Defalcators, 92 J. ACCT. 576, 577 (1951) [hereinafter Cressey, Trusted Persons]. Gwynn Nettler
reports that it was the “moral denigration of the embezzler that piqued Cressey and against which
his hypothesis has been advanced.” Gwynn Nettler, Embezzlement Without Problems, 14 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 70, 72 (1974).
28. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 12 (emphasis added).
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Cressey conducted interviews with inmates in three penitentiaries (one
each in California, Illinois, and Indiana),29 who, after apparently accepting a
position of trust in good faith, had been convicted of embezzlement or a
similar crime.30 Cressey’s sample included a total of 133 men.31 Because
Cressey was not interested in the career criminal or people who had accepted
a position planning to embezzle, he excluded from his sample numerous
inmates who had not accepted the position of trust in good faith.32
The method Cressey used was analytic induction, which “involves a
researcher beginning with a set of postulates and then continually readjusting
them so that they encompass all evidence that the data produce. Thus, if a
negative case is found, the hypothesis is reformulated until all cases support
the generalization.”33 Cressey states that his “formulation of hypotheses was
guided entirely by the search for negative cases” to disprove the hypotheses.34
Using this methodology, Cressey rejected several hypotheses as not fitting all
of the inmates he interviewed.35 Ultimately, he phrased his summary as
follows:
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive of
themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable;
(2) have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be
secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and
(3) are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation a
verbalization which enables them to adjust their conceptions of

29. Id. at 22–23. The interviews were conducted from 1949 to 1951. Id. Cressey’s sample
included both state and federal prisoners. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 14 (“I
was disturbed because my sample of embezzlers included very few bankers; this was because
embezzlement is a federal offense and most of my interviews had been conducted in state prisons.
So I spent a summer working in the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.”).
30. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578. Due to differences in legal definitions,
Cressey’s criteria for inclusion did not require that the crime constitute “embezzlement” under
applicable law. Instead, the study focused on inmates who had “accepted a position of trust in
good faith” and later “violated that trust by committing a crime.” CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S
MONEY, supra note 16, at 20.
31. Id. at 25 (“The 73 inmates at Joliet, [Illinois;] the 21 at Chino[, California;] and the 39
at Terre Haute[, Indiana] whose cases met the criteria were interviewed frequently and at
length.”). Thus, Cressey’s subjects, unlike Svend Riemer’s—discussed below—were not
specifically selected on the basis of having raised or been considered for an insanity defense. See
infra text accompanying notes 119–20 (discussing Riemer’s case selection).
32. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that he screened 503
inmates and “as expected, . . . many cases did not meet the first criterion—acceptance of a
position of trust in good faith”). Some scholars have referred to the type of criminal Cressey was
focused on as the “accidental fraudster.” See Jack Dorminey, A. Scott Fleming, Mary-Jo Kranacher
& Richard A. Riley, Jr., The Evolution of Fraud Theory, 27 ISSUES ACCT. EDUC. 555, 565–66 (2012)
[hereinafter Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory]. This contrasts with what may be termed
a “predator.” See id. at 565–68.
33. Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 225.
34. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 17.
35. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578.
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themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves
as users of the entrusted funds or property.36
Thus, Cressey found three factors common to individuals who became
embezzlers or similar trust violators.37 These three factors are typically
credited with providing the origin of the fraud triangle theory.38 Cressey’s first
factor, a non-shareable financial pressure, could involve something embarrassing
to the individual, such as a gambling debt39 or failure of his business.40 Cressey
considered non-shareability—the subjective inability to tell intimates, such as
the individual’s wife41—critical to embezzlement.42 Of Cressey’s three factors,
this one has undergone the most change over the years, as discussed below.
Cressey’s second factor involves the perceived opportunity to commit the
trust violation.43 Cressey argued that opportunity involved not just holding the
position of trust but also perceiving the opportunity to convert entrusted
funds for one’s own use.44 The trust violator may also use technical skills to

36. Id. at 577–78.
37. Cressey found that all three factors he identified as common to the cases were necessary
for the crime to occur. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 31 (“The entire
process must be present.”).
38. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
39. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578.
40. Id. at 579–80.
41. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28 (“[T]he specific hypothesis
here was unknowingly suggested by a prisoner who stated that he believed that no embezzlement
would ever occur if the trusted person always told his wife and family about his financial problems,
no matter what the consequences.”); Donald R. Cressey, The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust,
15 AM. SOCIO. REV. 738, 742 n.13 (1950) [hereinafter Cressey, Criminal Violation] (“None of [the
trust violators], of course, used the words ‘non-shareable problem,’ but many of them stated that
they were ‘ashamed’ to tell anyone of a certain situation or that they had ‘too much false pride’
to get help from others.”).
42. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 34, 75; Cressey, Respectable
Criminal, supra note 24, at 15 (“Wherever a company program solves a financial problem, or
makes it shareable, embezzlement will not occur.”). However, “[t]hirty years after his original
research, Cressey concluded that while the unshareable problem was important, it was ‘not
critical,’ and it was the neutralization of the criminal nature of the behavior that was his most
salient finding.” Gary S. Green, White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement, 525 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 102 (1993).
At least one of the cases Cressey considered seems to undermine the non-shareability
factor. Cressey quotes Case 237, which was “[f]rom the files of a District Attorney’s Office,” as
involving a banker whose “wife needed some medical attention of an unethical nature, and
through a friend he got in touch with a doctor in X who” later demanded money from him.
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 71. In this case, the embezzler’s wife was aware
of at least the source of the financial pressure—the “unethical” medical service. Cf. id. at 50
(quoting Case 99 as stating, “My wife only knew about it when I got about $3,000 short.”).
43. See id. at 77.
44. Id.
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identify the opportunity45 that “opens the doorway to fraud.”46 For example,
in Cressey’s Case 47, an accountant stated:
I learned all of it in school and in my ordinary accounting
experience. In school they teach you in your advanced years how to
detect embezzlements, and you sort of absorb it. . . . I did not use
any techniques which any ordinary accountant in my position could
not have used . . . .47
The third Cressey factor is rationalization of the behavior as somehow
acceptable48—a mental verbalization of the planned act as not really criminal
or morally wrong.49 Cressey stated that the rationalizing thought process of
the eventual trust violator occurred before the trust violation, allowing it to
occur.50 Rationalization serves the psychological purpose of minimizing the
cognitive dissonance between thinking of oneself as honest and committing a
dishonest act.51
Cressey further argued that “[e]ach trusted person does not invent a new
rationalization for his violation of trust, but instead he applies to his own
situation a verbalization which has been made available to him by virtue of his
having come into contact with a culture in which such verbalizations are

45. Id. at 78–79, 85.
46. Wolfe & Hermanson, supra note 13, at 38. Wolfe and Hermanson coined the term
“fraud diamond” by adding the fourth factor of “capability” to the fraud triangle framework. See
id. at 38–40. They state, in part:
Opportunity opens the doorway to fraud, and incentive and rationalization can draw
the person toward it. But the person must have the capability to recognize the open
doorway as an opportunity and to take advantage of it by walking through, not just
once, but time and time again. Accordingly, the critical question is, “Who could turn
an opportunity for fraud into reality?”
Id. at 38–39.
As the discussion in the text illustrates, Cressey’s use of the term “perceived opportunity”
seems to include the skills necessary to exploit the opportunity. However, Wolfe and Hermanson
seem focused on somewhat different things than Cressey was. Their focus, though overlapping
with Cressey’s, seems focused more on the repeated fraudster taking advantage of a perceived
opportunity “not just once, but time and time again,” than on what brings a previously honest
person to embezzle for the first time. Id. at 39. Wolfe and Hermanson also describe “capability”
as involving attributes of the fraudster that include not only the knowledge and intelligence
necessary to carry out the fraud, but also the skills needed to avoid detection. Id. at 40 (“[A]
successful fraudster lies effectively and consistently. To avoid detection, she must look auditors,
investors, and others right in the eye and lie convincingly. She also possesses the skill to keep
track of the lies, so that the overall story remains consistent.”).
47. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 82.
48. Id. at 93.
49. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 15.
50. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 94 (“In the cases of trust violation
encountered[,] significant rationalizations were always present before the criminal act took place,
or at least at the time it took place, and, in fact, after the act had taken place[,] the rationalization
often was abandoned.”).
51. Sridhar Ramamoorti, The Psychology and Sociology of Fraud: Integrating the Behavioral Sciences
Component into Fraud and Forensic Accounting Curricula, 23 ISSUES ACCT. EDUC. 521, 525 (2008).
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present.”52 This is reminiscent of the view of his mentor, Edwin Sutherland,
that criminality is learned, rather than inherent.53
In searching for negative cases, Cressey stated that he examined the cases
of the 133 men he interviewed, an additional approximately 200 case files
“collected by E. H. Sutherland in the 1930’s,”54 and other cases that Cressey
found in the literature. He found that all cases he examined fit the three
criteria or, if incomplete for his purposes, did not contain information
inconsistent with those criteria.55 Cressey quotes from multiple case files to
provide examples of each of the three criteria.56
2. Critiques of Cressey’s Work, and Subsequent
Studies of Embezzlement
Cressey’s approach has the virtue of developing a succinct theory about
why otherwise (presumably) honest individuals embezzle. However, it suffers
from some deficiencies, particularly when extended beyond the population
that Cressey studied. First, the analytic-induction methodology is itself an
issue. Most notably, it lacks predictive power, serving only to describe the cases

52.
53.

CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 137.
See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. Gary Green explains:

Cressey initially attempted to ascertain whether differential association explained
embezzlement. The effort was understandable because Sutherland, his mentor, had
labeled embezzlement a “white-collar crime” and had insisted that differential
association was the most plausible explanation for all white-collar crime. While
Cressey abandoned differential association early in his study as a root cause of
embezzlement, he did report that his findings provided indirect support for the
theory.
Green, supra note 42, at 103 (footnotes omitted); see also Donald R. Cressey, Application and
Verification of the Differential Association Theory, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 43, 51
(1952) (“While the general contention of the differential association theory, that criminality is
learned, cannot be disputed, the more specific idea that criminality and non-criminality depend
upon a ratio of contacts with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns is open to question in
cases of crimes involving violation of financial trust.”).
54. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 30. Few background details are
provided about these cases. See Marshall B. Clinard, Book Review, 19 AM. SOCIO. REV. 362, 362
(1954) (reviewing CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16) (“[E]xactly how he used
[Sutherland’s] material and what information was available is not clear.”). Cressey does state in a
footnote in his book that “[c]ases numbered 1 to 200 were collected by the writer, cases
numbered 201 to 300 were collected by E. H. Sutherland in the 1930’s, and cases numbered 301
to 400 are from other sources.” CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 170 n.3.
These numbers are oddly round and do not seem to correspond to other figures in the book.
That is, Cressey states in the text of the book that his interview sample consisted of 133 inmates
—not 200—and that Sutherland had collected approximately 200 cases—not 100. See id. at 25, 30.
55. Id. at 30. Some of the cases Cressey did not collect himself lacked “crucial information”
relating to Cressey’s hypothesis. Id.
56. See, e.g., id. at 37 (quoting from multiple case files relating to a non-shareable problem);
id. at 81 (quoting from two case files relating to opportunity on just that page); id. at 103 (quoting
from a case file relating to the “borrowing” rationalization).
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that have already been identified,57 as Cressey recognized.58 Also, because
Cressey did not “us[e] the more straightforward method of strict hypothesis
testing[,] Cressey may well have forced his interpretations to fit his theme.”59
In addition, Cressey did not interview trusted individuals who were not known
to have committed a trust violation, to see if they shared the three factors,60
so his study was not designed to have a control group. Instead, Cressey
considered “[e]ach trust violator [as] his own ‘control’ since each of them at
a prior time had been a non-violator.”61
Second, the interview methodology means that Cressey relied on the
inmates’ recollection of past events. It is possible that their recollections
regarding the order of events was incorrect or distorted, perhaps in a
systematic way. For example, some inmates may not have admitted to Cressey
that they had also embezzled at previous times. Similarly, some inmates may
state that they could not share the quandary with others as a post hoc
justification of why they did not solve the problem using legitimate means. In
other words, it is possible that, at the time of the financial pressure, the subject
did not regard the problem as non-shareable, but rather came up with a
solution (embezzlement) that was non-shareable.62 In addition, Cressey’s
argument that rationalization occurred before rather than after the offense

57. Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 225 (“[Analytic induction] contains a major
shortcoming from a scientific viewpoint in that it is not possible to use it for predictive
purposes.”); see also id. (“The death rite for analytic induction was pronounced by John Laub and
Robert Sampson in 1991: ‘No empirical research today is guided by the theory.’”); Robert
Schafer, Book Review, 3 INT’L REV. MOD. SOCIO. 114, 116 (1973) (reviewing CRESSEY, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16) (“In effect, the theory is limited to a post factum explanation of
behavior. The reason for this lack of predictive capacity is that there is no basis for determining
beforehand if the conditions specified as necessary for embezzlement will exist in a particular
case.”).
58. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 153 (“The theory . . . has few
practical implications either for prevention and detection of trust violation or for treatment of
apprehended offenders.”).
59. Green, supra note 42, at 102.
60. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22–25.
61. Id. at 70; see also id. at 31 (finding “as evidence of validity” that none of the cases
contradicted his hypothesis). However,
[t]rust violators had to report whether in the past they conceived of themselves as
having had any other non-shareable financial problem, whether adequate
rationalizations and the other factors were present at the time, data which would
appear difficult to recall because they required subjective interpretations of past
events rather than facts.
Clinard, supra note 54, at 363.
Cressey also discusses a case in the literature that included consideration of the brother
of an inmate who, like the inmate, was a bank manager, but who had not embezzled. CRESSEY,
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 45–47.
62. See Alexander Schuchter & Michael Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle: Swiss and Austrian
Elite Fraudsters, 39 ACCT. F. 176, 184 (2015) [hereinafter Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud
Triangle] (“Data acquisition in this area of research commonly takes place after the perpetrator
has committed a crime, so one might regard retrospective reflections—even if believed by
offenders themselves—as being contaminated by post-event processes, rather than as a ‘black
box’ flight recorder.”).
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may be incorrect; the inmates’ “rationalizations [may instead have] emerged
afterward to repress feelings of guilt.”63
Third, Cressey interviewed only inmates, so his theory was largely derived
from trust violators who were actually caught, prosecuted, found guilty, and
incarcerated.64 It is possible that the commonalities Cressey found would not
be true of embezzlers who were not incarcerated.65 For example, judges and
juries may find trust violators who had a problem of an embarrassing nature
such that the embezzler kept it secret less sympathetic or more “guilty” than
individuals who embezzle for a non-illicit or altruistic motive, such as to help
an ill family member. Individuals in the latter category may thus be less likely
to be convicted or to receive a prison sentence. Thus, Cressey’s study may
suffer from selection bias when generalized beyond inmates.
Fourth, Cressey’s findings may be culture-specific, reflecting the context
for U.S. males in the early 1950s.66 One aspect that may reflect Cressey’s era
and his focus on men is that some of his interviewees mentioned that they
kept their financial troubles from their wives.67 In fact, Cressey’s “specific
hypothesis . . . was unknowingly suggested by a prisoner who stated that he
believed that no embezzlement would ever occur if the trusted person always
told his wife and family about his financial problems, no matter what the
consequences.”68 This obviously assumes an embezzler who is male and
married to a woman.69 In direct contrast with Cressey’s findings, a 1974 article
by Gwynn Nettler considering six Canadian embezzlement cases notes that in

63. Green, supra note 42, at 103.
64. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22–25.
65. See Clinard, supra note 54, at 363 (“The results might be different if other samples of
undetected violators, those discovered and not prosecuted because of restitution, etc., or those
placed on probation were studied using his hypothesis.”).
66. Cf. Grace Mui & Jennifer Mailley, A Tale of Two Triangles: Comparing the Fraud Triangle
with Criminology’s Crime Triangle, 28 ACCT. RSCH. J. 45, 47 (2015) (“[T]he Fraud Triangle is
unique to the societal context of the USA (Czielewski, 2012), which is a consequence of its origins
in the USA (Cressey, 1953; Sutherland, 1940, 1944).”).
67. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 71 (quoting Case 116 as stating,
“Even my wife didn’t know.”).
Jonson and Geis state, “it is noteworthy that not one of the married men in the sample
was able to share his dilemma with his wife.” Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 226. It is not clear
if Cressey covered this specific issue with every married inmate in the sample, however. Also, it
appears that at least one or two of the men’s wives knew of the financial difficulties at some point.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Additionally, it is possible that the men Cressey
excluded from the sample because they did not accept the position of trust planning to hold the
money in trust in good faith had shared more information with their intimates.
68. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28.
69. Some of the inmates’ wives may have been kept in the dark about their husbands’
finances more broadly. At least one of Cressey’s interviewees mentioned that his wife did not
know how much he earned. See id. at 43 (quoting Case 33, “[My wife] never knew how much I
made.”); cf. id. at 50 (quoting Case 99, “I gave [my wife] the impression right along that I’m going
great guns. Why should I tell her and worry her about it?”); id. at 62 (quoting Case 305, “I suppose
I should explain here, that I never bothered [my wife] with any of my troubles; after all, she was
concerned with raising the children—she had a tough enough time of it.” (alteration in
original)).
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one case “the ‘problem,’ how to keep the beloved land, was not unshared. It
was fully and repetitively discussed with the embezzler’s wife.”70
Fifth, Cressey’s work has been criticized as focusing on “individualistic
explanations of criminal behavior, overlooking the micro-sociological (one’s
immediate social and organizational environment) as well as macro-sociological
explanations (broader historical, economic, and political factors).”71 Morales
et al. state that “Cressey’s work is thus based on a very particular conception
of white-collar crime that marginalizes social environments and circumstances.”72
Given the limits of Cressey’s sample and study design, Cressey’s three
factors should not be viewed as a definitive statement regarding the causes of
embezzlement, even when examining the problem from an offender-focused
perspective. And in fact, Cressey regarded the project as one in search of a
case that would falsify his hypothesis.73 Subsequent studies have found cases
that are inconsistent with Cressey’s factors. For example, Nettler’s 1974 article
on six Canadian cases involving large embezzlements found that “in only one
of these six instances was it possible to construct a parallel between the
embezzling career Cressey portrays and the facts of our Canadian cases.”74
Nettler noted the absence of a non-shareable problem, stating, “[d]esire and
opportunity generate theft more frequently in these instances than does a
financial difficulty kept privy.”75 Nettler also found that “[t]hese five
exceptions to Cressey’s singular road to fraud are more clearly described as
individuals who wanted things they could not afford and who were presented
with (or who invented) ways of taking other people’s money.”76
In 1981, Dorothy Zietz published a study on female trust violators in the
California Institution for Women.77 For purposes of comparing her findings
with Cressey’s, Zietz excluded from her initial sample inmates who had an ex
ante intent to steal or defraud.78 She found that the “opportunity” aspect

70. Nettler, supra note 27, at 74–75.
71. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 176 (citation omitted).
72. Id.; cf. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 185 (“Granted, as is
usually the case with models, the FT does still offer an incomplete but useful abstraction of
complex interactions, it nevertheless neglects the impact of social systems on individual decisions
to commit fraud.”). However, the accounting standards that rely on the fraud triangle include
the context of a pressure-filled environment as part of the “rationalization” prong. The standards
state that “even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an environment that imposes
sufficient pressure on them.” CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements
on Auditing Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra
note 10, ¶ A1.
73. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 32.
74. Nettler, supra note 27, at 74.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 75.
77. DOROTHY ZIETZ, WOMEN WHO EMBEZZLE OR DEFRAUD 23–24 (1981). The initial sample
was 100 women. Id. at 24.
78. Id. at 25. She considers those women separately, but it is not clear how many women
that included. See id. at 87–123 (Part III, titled “Women Who Intended to Steal or Defraud”).
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applied just as it had in Cressey’s study.79 However, she found differences with
respect to the other two factors, with differences from Cressey’s first factor (a
non-shareable problem) most substantial. For example, in some cases, the
financial need was caused by a husband or child’s need for medical care—a
“shareable” type of problem.80 Zietz found Cressey’s third factor, rationalization,
applicable, but she also found that rationalizations may differ for women, due
to gender-based norms.81 Zietz concluded that, although her findings could
not necessarily be extrapolated to all female trust violators, she had found
negative cases that did not fit Cressey’s three-part generalization.82
Thus, Cressey and Zietz found somewhat different commonalities among
the convicted embezzlers they each studied. Yet, the factors that they, as well
as Svend Riemer, whose work is discussed below,83 found central to trust
violations can all be characterized as consisting of (1) a financial motive;
(2) an opportunity to commit the violation; and (3) a role for psychological
aspects in the offender’s decision-making.
B. “FUN WHILE IT LASTED”: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
An aspect that the fraud triangle’s prongs do not specifically address is
learning from the embezzlement experience—particularly learning that trust
violations are not promptly detected. Cressey’s study did not focus on this
issue, probably because his interest was in what prompted a trusted individual
to first betray that trust.84 Some learning may lead to subsequent violations.
That is, someone who starts by embezzling a small amount may increase it
over time, both as financial pressures or desires increase but also as the early
violations go undetected.
Learning has a role in the “opportunity” element because undetected
early violations may make the opportunity seem to continue or enlarge. With
respect to the rationalization prong, learning that not all violations of trust
are detected may help empower the individual to rationalize that the funds
are not missed or that the behavior is not that bad since it is not being

79. Id. at 62. Zietz notes that “most of these women had been employed as bookkeepers,
accountants, or clerks responsible in some way for other people’s money.” Id.
80. Id. at 76. In other cases, the embezzler was encouraged by trying “to retain or regain the
affections of [her husband],” so the situational context was not kept from him. Id.
81. Id. at 77 (“[C]ultural ideologies affecting the development of their role models (such
as wife, mother, and daughter) will need to be recognized as possible sources for the vocabularies
of adjustment used by women.”).
82. Id. Zietz recognizes possible selection bias:
[F]urther research is needed to determine . . . whether the results are skewed by
the fact that many women are not sentenced to a state prison after trust violation
(for example, women with small children, or women able to plea bargain when
employers are reimbursed by relatives or a bonding company).
Id.
83.
84.

See infra text accompanying notes 118–28.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
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punished.85 For example, in Cressey’s Case 56, discussed in connection with
the awareness of the opportunity, the individual states:
I needed money very badly, and at first I didn’t think of taking it
from company funds. . . . I sat up all one night drinking . . . . In the
morning I . . . went down to work and took some money ($150) out
of the safe. I reasoned that I was going to pay it back in three or four
days, and I did pay it back. In a matter of a few days I took some
more—it got easier as time went on. . . . The most I ever took at one
time was about $1,000 in one twenty-four hour period.86
In this example, the individual faced financial pressure (the first element of
the triangle), eventually perceived the opportunity to take money from the
safe at work (the second element), and rationalized it as a “loan” (the third
element). The process of “borrowing” and “repaying” provided learning that
eased the process and allowed him to increase over time the amount taken.
The situation that Bruce McNall—a coin dealer, Hollywood producer,
and hockey team owner who eventually pled guilty to bank fraud87—describes
in his co-authored autobiography, Fun While It Lasted,88 provides another
illustration. McNall’s financial troubles apparently began when the largest
client of his business selling ancient coins, Bunker Hunt, was trying to sell a
substantial amount of silver.89 Hunt’s difficulties had arisen because, after
silver was selling for as high as $50 per ounce in January 1980, “[b]y early
spring, Bunker . . . [was] committed to buy vast quantities of silver at $35 an
ounce in a market where it was worth about $12.”90 McNall explains that when
he
presented [Bunker Hunt] with a list of ancient coins I thought he
should buy, Bunker suggested a bit of creative financing that would
help him shed more silver than the law allowed. Instead of paying
cash for the coins, he would give me, in private, $20 million worth
of silver that he had in storage . . . . I could sell it right away or hold
it.91

85. The fraudster may also become desensitized to the feeling of having committed a bad
act. Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory, supra note 32, at 566 (“After the criminal act has
taken place, especially if the fraud has taken place for a long period of time, the rationalization
will likely be abandoned or cognitively dismissed. As the act is repeated, the perpetrator becomes
de-sensitized.”).
86. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 90.
87. See Sports Executive Enters Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/
1994/12/15/business/sports-executive-enters-guilty-plea.html [https://perma.cc/BQ9Z-5TU7].
88. See generally BRUCE MCNALL WITH MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, FUN WHILE IT LASTED: MY RISE
AND FALL IN THE LAND OF FAME AND FORTUNE (2003) (telling McNall’s story).
89. See id. at 71.
90. Id. at 68.
91. Id. at 71. McNall does not express concern about financing that was apparently designed
to circumvent applicable law. In part, that may be because of the value of the client to him. Also,
other descriptions in the book suggest that McNall was already comfortable at that point with
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This approach was attractive to McNall because “Bunker was working
. . . to try to make the price go back up. He was sure that the market was just
in a short-term dip.”92 Although Bunker did not know it, McNall did not
actually have the coins he had suggested that Bunker buy.93 McNall decided
to “gamble with the price of silver” and hope to make a few million dollars
once the price rose, then acquire the coins.94 McNall explains that “I took the
risk with Bunker’s investment because my relationship with him had grown so
close, so familiar. I also felt comfortable doing it because I was making lots of
money for him, especially with horses.”95
Unfortunately for McNall, the value of silver declined to six dollars an
ounce and McNall did not have the funds to buy the coins.96 McNall
rationalized lying to Bunker about his possession of the coins on the basis of
numerous favors he had done for Bunker in the past, including money McNall
had lost97 in helping Bunker report a tax loss.98 When auditors demanded to
see the coins, McNall, with the help of his staff, bought some of the coins on
the list, borrowed some, and relabeled another important client’s coins.99
Unexpectedly, the auditors took the collection McNall had labeled as
Bunker’s, making McNall unable to return the coins to their owners as
planned.100 McNall learned from this experience that his staff would help him
unquestioningly:
I was pleasantly surprised when not one person hesitated to help.
But I was astounded when, in the end, not one pointed out that I
had been reckless, even fraudulent, in my dealings. Later I would
realize that they were all too dependent on me to see any other
course.101

some level of legal transgression (such as smuggling coins out of Tunisia). See infra text accompanying
notes 103–07.
92. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 71. The Hunt brothers are known to have
“attempted to manipulate the price of silver in 1979.” Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation,
102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1939 (2017). Professor Fletcher explains that “regulators became aware
of their schemes in a matter of months because of the observable impact it had on the price of
silver.” Id.
93. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 71.
94. Id. at 72.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 73. Schuchter and Levi state regarding the first element of the fraud triangle,
“[w]hat was once a mere incentive can turn into pressure to continue.” Schuchter & Levi,
Revisited, supra note 14, at 110.
97. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 73 (“The millions of dollars I had shoveled to
Bunker for horses; the Tunney-brokered bailout; the $650,000 I lost on that New Year’s Eve silver
deal; all of that was in my mind as I continued to lie to Bunker about the coins I had supposedly
bought for him after he gave me all that silver.”).
98. Id. at 64 (describing the New Year’s Eve transaction).
99. Id. at 73–76.
100. Id. at 76–77.
101. Id. at 74.
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McNall recounted that “[r]ather than feeling chastened and humbled, [he]
felt as if [he] had made a great escape” and “had taken a risk, and survived.”102
In other words, McNall learned from this experience, but he felt that he
learned the wrong lesson—he could get away with this kind of illegal activity.
Although this series of events seems to have been where the trouble that
eventually landed McNall in prison began, it does not appear to be his first
transgression. He describes smuggling antique coins out of Tunisia as a young
man, where “the removal of antiquities was punishable by a twenty-year prison
term.”103 McNall explains that this was before most airports had metal
detectors, so he and his traveling companion, the 16-year-old son of an
ancient coin expert,104 “selected the most valuable ones and put them in our
pockets, in our shoes, even in the cuffs of our pants. The rest . . . were
. . . distributed in our luggage.”105 When asked at the airport if they “were
transporting any national treasure,” they simply said no.106 This type of
experience may be an early example of learning that opportunities existed for
enrichment despite legal prohibitions.107 Thus, McNall’s story provides a
window into how initial trust violations can provide a learning experience that
may foster subsequent violations.
III. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
Some of the origins of the fraud triangle, including the source of its
name, are subject to differing claims. This Part examines the competing
claims about the origins and development of the fraud triangle in an effort to
clear up confusion in the literature.
A. THE SOURCE OF THE FACTORS
The source of the triangle’s three factors is sometimes disputed.108 For
example, Professors Schuchter and Levi point to a source other than Cressey

102. Id. at 78.
103. Id. at 32.
104. Id. at 8 (describing Joel Malter); id. at 24 (referring to Malter’s 16-year-old son,
Michael); id. at 32 (describing how McNall and Michael got the coins out of Tunisia).
105. Id. at 32–33.
106. Id. at 33.
107. McNall later explains in connection with another potential coin purchase:
Like every other retailer in the world, I wasn’t much concerned with the coins’
origins. If you investigate thoroughly you will discover that at some point, virtually
every ancient coin on the market was smuggled, stolen, or otherwise the subject
of shady dealing. . . . It’s a state of affairs that is widely accepted, even by lawenforcement authorities, and only leads to problems when questions about a sale
become public.
Id. at 64.
108. One scholar has argued that Cressey’s three factors are “loosely based on what
policemen and detectives have referred to as ‘means, motives, and opportunity.’” Ramamoorti,
supra note 51, at 525. Cressey’s first factor, a non-shareable problem, involves motive, and Cressey
does list opportunity. Opportunity may also include means, although means may be more closely
analogous to a fourth factor added by the “fraud diamond.” See Wolfe & Hermanson, supra
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for the idea behind the fraud triangle. They state that “the original idea came
largely from a European, Svend Riemer (1941).”109 Riemer, like Cressey and
Sutherland, was a sociologist. Schuchter and Levi note that Cressey’s book
cites Riemer in his discussion of opportunity, and “Riemer points out that a
potential fraudster needs a situation, which offers an opportunity; a driving
force in an emergency situation, which may consist of a plurality of
environmental constellations; and psycho-pathological conditions have to be
considered as well.”110 Schuchter and Levi “hypothesize that Cressey was
strongly inspired by Riemer’s work when developing an initial Fraud Triangle
approach.”111
Cressey was certainly aware of the relevance of Riemer’s work. The
“Review of the Literature” section of Cressey’s 1950 Ph.D. dissertation states
that “only three sociologists have published detailed accounts of research on
embezzlement.”112 Riemer is one of them, and Cressey summarizes Riemer’s
article.113 In addition, although it may not be well known, Cressey and Riemer
were colleagues on the “sociology faculty”114 at the University of California,
Los Angeles for about a year prior to the time Cressey published the 1953
book that grew out of his dissertation research.115 However, Riemer’s study
—although also conscious of Sutherland’s “differential association” theory of
crime116—had a very different focus than Cressey’s. In addition, Cressey’s
note 13, at 38–40 (proposing the addition of a “capability” factor). Moreover, Cressey includes
an additional factor, “rationalization,” which focuses on psychological aspects of the violation. See
Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578.
109. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 177 (citation omitted).
110. Schuchter & Levi, Revisited, supra note 14, at 108.
111. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 109.
112. Donald Ray Cressey, Criminal Violation of Financial Trust 20 (May 1950) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cressey, Dissertation].
113. Id. at 23–25.
114. At the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”), Sociology did not become its
own department until 1964–65. History: UCLA Sociology Chairs, UCLA COLL. SOC. SCIS.: SOCIO.,
https://soc.ucla.edu/content/history [https://perma.cc/8ZBY-GPDC].
115. Cressey joined the UCLA faculty in 1950. Akers & Matsueda, supra note 18, at 424. He
remained there until he moved to U.C. Santa Barbara in 1961. Id. Riemer joined the UCLA
Sociology faculty in 1952, moving there from the University of Wisconsin. Ivan Light, Svend Henry
Riemer, Sociology: Los Angeles, in UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: IN MEMORIAM, SEPTEMBER 1978, at
145, 146 (1978), http://texts.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb4q2nb2nd&brand=calisphere&doc.view
=entire_text [https://perma.cc/H5TD-MD5L]. Riemer remained at UCLA until he retired in
1972. Id. at 145. Thus, Cressey and Riemer were colleagues from 1952 to 1961.
Cressey conducted substantial work on his book after joining the UCLA faculty,
including adding interviews with inmates of two additional prisons. In his dissertation research,
“[t]he main source of direct information on trust violation was interview material obtained from
prisoners at the Illinois State Penitentiaries at Joliet, Illinois.” Cressey, Dissertation, supra note
112, at 40. He conducted the Chino, California interviews from October 1950 to May 1951,
presumably after he moved to California. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22
–23. He conducted the Terre Haute, Indiana interviews from June to August 1951. Id. at 23. This
was to add a federal prison. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
116. See Svend H. Riemer, Embezzlement: Pathological Basis, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 411,
412 n.3 (1942) (citing Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, and stating, “[o]ur field
of observation, however, does not permit any definite conclusions as to the validity of

A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE FRAUD TRIANGLE AND TAX EVASION

3/26/2021 4:05 PM

1171

framework grew out of interviews during which he tested and rejected the
theories of several scholars, including Riemer.
On the first point—the focus each scholar had—Cressey was explicitly
interested in developing a theory regarding what factors caused a previously
honest individual to become a trust violator.117 By contrast, Riemer’s 1942
article, “Embezzlement: Pathological Basis,” focused on cases involving
medical pathologies.118 The study was based on analysis of the case files of
100 convicted embezzlers from a “prison clinic in Stockholm, Sweden.”119 The
inmates in the prison clinic were those for whom someone had raised the
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.120 Based on this population, Riemer
developed six “Socio-genetic Types of Embezzlement.”121
Riemer begins his article by listing three factors relevant to the “conflict
situation in which the criminal act originates”: “1) the social pull; the
opportunity,” “2) the social push; the emergency situation,” and “3) specific to our
material; the psycho-pathological element involved.”122 As the title of his article
and this wording suggests, Riemer’s principal focus was on the third factor.123
Riemer therefore considered the psychiatric classification (or “pathological
tendencies”) of each individual.124 For example, he described some of the

Sutherland’s thesis”). Two of the four citations in Riemer’s article are to Sutherland’s work. In
addition to the one cited just above, Riemer cites to Sutherland’s textbook, along with another
textbook. See id. at 413 n.4 (“The need of investigations into ‘behavior systems’ or ‘behavior
sequences’ of crime has been stressed repeatedly in the methodological discussions of recent textbook editions. Cp. E. H. Sutherland and Walter C. Reckless.”).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 27–32; see also Cressey, Dissertation, supra note 112,
at 1 (“The objective of this study is the isolation and definition of the processes involved in
violating, in a criminal manner, positions of financial trust which have been accepted in good
faith.”).
118. See Riemer, supra note 116, at 411–12.
119. Id. at 411 n.1.
120. Id. (“Only such cases are transferred to the prison clinic in behalf of which insanity is
pleaded by either defense, judge or district attorney.”). Riemer’s cases included both men and
women. See id. at 423.
121. Id. at 417; see also id. at 417–23, 420 tbl.IV (listing the six types).
122. Id. at 411 (emphasis added). The source of the factors is not stated. See id. at 411–14.
The terms “social pull” and “social push” are not original with Riemer. See, e.g., ARLAND D. WEEKS,
SOCIAL ANTAGONISMS 6 (1918) (using the term “social pull”).
123. Riemer termed that “specific to our material.” Riemer, supra note 116, at 411; see also
id. at 412 n.3 (noting that, due to the setting, “[o]ur attention is limited to mainly pathological
cases”).
Riemer does spend a few pages discussing the other factors. With respect to
“opportunity,” Riemer pointed to trust that can be exploited by someone engaged in a business
transaction. Id. at 412 (“[T]he individual member of the group must to some extent be trusted
to adhere to certain folkways concerning money transactions. These loopholes represent the
opportunities that are open to the embezzler.”). Regarding the “emergency situation,” Riemer
found that “[e]mbezzlement in the great majority of cases represents the only way out of an
extreme economic emergency situation.” Id. at 414. A declining career, including risk of losing
the family home, was a prime example. Id.
124. Id. at 419 tbl.III; see also id. at 416 (considering “the traditional psychiatric classification
of reaction patterns as an additional approach to the discussion of pertinent environmental
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embezzlers as paranoid, depressive, manic, or suicidal.125 Some he labelled as
suffering from alcoholism in addition to another classification.126
On the second point—how Cressey developed his theory—Cressey
describes in his book developing a series of hypotheses based on the work of
previous scholars. Cressey’s first hypothesis was based on his mentor Edwin
Sutherland’s writing on white collar crime127 and was that
the incumbent has learned in connection [with] the business or
profession in which he is employed that some forms of trust violation
are merely technical violations and are not really “illegal” or
“wrong,” and, on the negative side, that they are not violated if this
kind of definition of behavior has not been learned.128
Cressey quickly rejected this first hypothesis because some of the interviewees
said they did not know anyone else behaving similarly, others defined the
behavior as theft, and some trust violators “expressed the idea that they knew
the behavior to be illegal and wrong at all times and that they had merely
‘kidded themselves’ into thinking that it was not illegal.”129
Cressey then developed a second hypothesis “in part based on Riemer’s
observation that the ‘opportunities’ inherent in trust positions form
‘temptations’ if the incumbents develop anti-social attitudes.”130 The framing
of this hypothesis required Riemer’s element of an emergency situation to be
present.131 Cressey abandoned this approach “when persons were found who

constellations”). Riemer stated “that [his] interest is related entirely to the ensuing distortion of
the definition of the situation.” Id.
125. Id. Riemer did not find pathological tendencies in all of the subjects. See id. at 419 tbl.III
(noting no pathological tendencies in such cases as Case 74, involving a post official, and Case
77, involving a police officer).
126. Id.
127. This was the case despite the fact that in his book, Cressey stated that the trust-violation
crimes he studied did not constitute “white collar crime” as defined by Sutherland because
Sutherland has defined that type of crime as violation of law by persons of
respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations. . . . While the
crimes of trust violators are committed in the course of their occupations, many of
the violators encountered cannot be considered as persons of high social status or
as respected persons of the community.
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 184 n.9 (citing SUTHERLAND, supra note 26,
at 9).
128. Id. at 27 (citing SUTHERLAND, supra note 26).
129. Id.
130. Id. Riemer stated in this regard:
[T]he individual member of the group must to some extent be trusted to adhere to
certain folkways concerning money transactions. These loopholes represent the
opportunities that are open to the embezzler. They form a temptation if the
embezzlers develop an anti-social attitude that makes possible an abandonment of
the ‘folkways’ of business behavior.
Riemer, supra note 116, at 412–13.
131. Cressey explained:
The formulation was that positions of trust are violated when the incumbent
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claimed that while an emergency had been present at the time they violated
the trust, other, perhaps even more extreme, emergencies had been present
in earlier periods when they did not violate it.”132
Cressey then shifted to a hypothesis involving the “psychological
isolation” of a non-shareable problem, based on work by LaPiere and
Farnsworth;133 rejected that based on interviewees’ statements; and ultimately
formed the final three-factor hypothesis,134 for which he did not find a
negative case.
Thus, Cressey was influenced by prior work on white-collar crime and
embezzlement, including Riemer’s work, but Cressey’s focus was different
from Riemer’s. Riemer’s article focused primarily on the pathologies of
embezzlers, while Cressey was interested in what caused a previously trustworthy
person to commit the first trust violation. The three factors on each list share
the “opportunity” factor, and Cressey credits “Riemer and others who have
written on embezzlement [as] hav[ing] used the term ‘opportunity’ to refer
to the position of trust which a person must necessarily hold before he can
embezzle.”135
Riemer and Cressey’s lists differ most on the third factor, with Riemer
pointing to a “psycho-pathological element” and Cressey to a mere
“rationalization.”136 The evolution of the factors as they were extended from
embezzlement to contexts such as accounting fraud shares does not involve
medical pathologies. The next Section discusses this evolution.
B. THE FACTORS’ PATH FROM EMBEZZLEMENT TO FRAUD
As noted above, current U.S. and international auditing standards reflect
the teachings of the fraud triangle.137 Those standards list the factors as
incentive or pressure, perceived opportunity, and rationalization.138 The

structures a real or supposed need for extra funds or extended use of property as an
“emergency” which cannot be met by legal means, and that if such an emergency
does not take place trust violation will not occur.
Cressey, Criminal Violation, supra note 41, at 741.
132. Id.
133. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28.
134. See supra text accompanying note 36 (describing Cressey’s conclusions and findings).
135. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 173 n.1. Riemer was not the first to
refer to the “opportunity” aspect of the crime of embezzlement. For example, a 1926 article states
that “[t]he fundamental causes for bank defalcations are two: first, a desire for something; and
secondly, the opportunity to gratify that desire.” William Ashdown, The Psychology of Embezzlement,
112 BANKERS’ MAG. 519, 521 (1926).
136. Compare supra text accompanying notes 123–24 (discussing Riemer’s third factor), with
supra text accompanying notes 48–49 (discussing Cressey’s third factor).
137. See supra text accompanying note 10.
138. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1.
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standards also use these three elements to help categorize “risk factors” for
fraud.139
The auditing standards describe the first prong as generally financial in
nature.140 The statement regarding “perceived opportunity” for fraud is brief
and points to an individual’s ability to override internal controls.141 Finally,
the standards describe the “rationalization” prong as relating either to
personal characteristics of the individual or resulting from a pressure-filled
environment:
Individuals may be able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act.
Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that
allow them knowingly and intentionally to commit a dishonest act.
However, even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an
environment that imposes sufficient pressure on them.142

139. See CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, at
app. 1.
140. See CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10,
¶ A1. The language generally is identical. The International Auditing Practices Committee
(“IAPC”) and U.S. Auditing Standards Board (“ASB”) apparently worked closely together.
According to the International Federation of Accountants the history is as follows:
In March 2001, the IAPC issued ISA 240. In March 2001, the US ASB invited
representatives of the IAPC to attend meetings of the US ASB’s Fraud Task Force.
The IAPC accepted the invitation with the view to obtaining an understanding of the
development of a revised US SAS 82 so that ISA 240 could be revised to converge
with the final revised US SAS 82, subject to any differences necessary to take account
of the international environment. In February 2002, the US ASB issued an exposure
draft Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The IAASB issued a response
letter to this exposure draft. In October 2002, the US ASB issued SAS 99.
Auditor’s Responsibility, supra note 12.
141. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (“A perceived opportunity
to commit fraud may exist when an individual believes internal control can be overridden . . . .”);
ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1 (same).
142. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); ISA
240, supra note 10, ¶ A1 (emphasis added). Donegan and Ganon criticized the AICPA standards
for what they see as an approach that exonerates the culture of the employer, stating that:
The triangle had the . . . advantage of explaining fraud as the action of a loner driven
by need, taking advantage of a lack of internal control. Thus . . . the search for the
culprit could focus on individual offenders, not on the culture that may have
encouraged and rewarded their actions.
James J. Donegan & Michele W. Ganon, Strain, Differential Association, and Coercion: Insights from
the Criminology Literature on Causes of Accountant’s Misconduct, 8 ACCT. & PUB. INT. 1, 3 (2008).
However, as the quotation in the text shows, the auditing standards’ discussion of the
“rationalization” prong refers to fraud resulting from sufficient pressure in the individual’s
environment. In addition, in the “incentive or pressure” prong, the AICPA focuses first on
employment-related pressures, and only then on lifestyle pressures:
Incentive or pressure to commit fraudulent financial reporting may exist when
management is under pressure, from sources outside or inside the entity, to achieve
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In the “risk factors” section, this factor is termed “attitudes or rationalizations.”143
Regarding how these factors came to be included in auditing standards,
several scholars explain that after high-profile accountants were convicted of
fraud, the AICPA adopted the fraud triangle approach from the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”).144 For example, accounting professors
Donegan and Ganon state that, “[w]hen the AICPA belatedly recognized the
need to consider why so many accountants were committing fraud they turned
to the ACFE, which, in effect, meant embracing Cressey’s perspective.”145
The ACFE was founded in 1988 by Joseph T. Wells.146 Wells was heavily
influenced by Cressey.147 In the early 1980s, Wells had connected with
Cressey, and Wells “ascribes much of the credit for the founding of the ACFE
to his relationship with Cressey.”148 “The ACFE’s mission is ‘to reduce the
incidence of fraud and white-collar crime and to assist the Membership in

an expected (and perhaps, unrealistic) earnings target or financial outcome
—particularly because the consequences to management for failing to meet
financial goals can be significant. Similarly, individuals may have an incentive to
misappropriate assets (for example, because the individuals are living beyond their
means).
CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards, AU-C
§ 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); ISA 240, supra note 10,
¶ A1 (emphasis added).
143. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, at
app. 1.
144. See Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3; Mark E. Lokanan, Challenges to the Fraud
Triangle: Questions on Its Usefulness, 39 ACCT. F. 201, 202 (2015) (“Concerned about the erosion
of ethical standards within the accounting profession, the [AICPA] in 2002 and the [IFAC] in
2006, followed the ACFE’s footsteps and turned to Cressey’s (1953) work on the fraud triangle
for potential explanations of the frauds.” (citation omitted)); Morales et al., supra note 19, at 182
(“The ACFE’s claim to expertise, [is] grounded in the imagery of the triangle, spread beyond its
confines,” to both ISA 240 and to the AICPA in SAS No. 99).
145. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3.
146. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 179; see also ACFE Leadership: Dr. Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA,
ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/bio-jwells.aspx [https://perma.cc/
4ZEM-KLG9] (providing Wells’ biography).
147. WELLS, supra note 25, at 21–22 (describing his friendship with Cressey and stating that
“although Cressey didn’t know it at the time, he created the concept of what eventually became
the Certified Fraud Examiner”).
148. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3 (erroneously referring to Wells as “Joseph
Walsh”).
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fraud detection and deterrence.’”149 The ACFE touts the fraud triangle as
assisting in the detection of fraud.150
Donegan and Ganon find “problematic . . . the generalization from a
sample of embezzlers to those who have committed financial statement
fraud.”151 Fraud and embezzlement are not identical. Black’s Law Dictionary’s
first definition of fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing
concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her
detriment.”152 Fraud is thus a fairly broad category. By contrast, embezzlement
is fairly narrow. Black’s Law Dictionary defines embezzlement as “[t]he
fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted,
esp[ecially] as a fiduciary.”153
Given this critique, it is worth examining how Cressey’s work was
extended to financial statement fraud. Recall that Cressey’s factors were (1) a
non-shareable problem; (2) a perceived opportunity; and (3) rationalization,
while the fraud triangle factors adopted by the AICPA are (1) incentive or
pressure; (2) a perceived opportunity; and (3) character or rationalization.154
Thus, the factors that Cressey developed in his study of embezzlers were not
simply copied over to the financial statement fraud context. The first and
third factors changed somewhat.

149. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 179 (quoting Who We Are, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD
EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/STG5-QTGW]). The ACFE
provides anti-fraud training, and it provides a certification called “Certified Fraud Examiner.”
Membership and Certification, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/
membership-certification.aspx [https://perma.cc/EN8S-SHV5]. Mark Lokanan has criticized
the ACFE’s use of the fraud triangle, in part because the ACFE has something to sell: “[I]t makes
sense that the ACFE uses the fraud triangle because the fraud triangle validates its very existence.
The theory here, in short, is that one’s chosen solution(s) actually specify or constitute the very
problem that needs to be addressed.” Lokanan, supra note 144, at 207.
150. See Morales et al., supra note 19, at 177 (“We found a . . . tendency to generalize in
. . . ACFE documents, suggesting that ACFE representatives are highly confident in the
knowledge base that allegedly underlies the fraud triangle concept. . . . [T]he knowledge base
claimed by the ACFE is presented as universal.” (footnote omitted)); see also Videos—The Fraud
Examiner: Why Do People Commit Fraud?, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS (Aug. 2017), https://
www.acfe.com/content.aspx?id=4294999346 [https://perma.cc/FF3W-XNT5] (describing the
video as follows: “Explore how pressure, opportunity and rationalization—called the Fraud
Triangle—can come together to influence an individual to commit fraud.”).
151. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3; see also Wm. Dennis Huber, Forensic Accounting,
Fraud Theory, and the End of the Fraud Triangle, 12 J. THEORETICAL ACCT. RSCH. 28, 30 (2017)
(arguing that “the fraud triangle . . . as originally developed and modified, has been misused,
abused, contorted, stretched out of shape, and pressed into uses for which it was never intended
and cannot possibly accommodate”).
152. Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); cf. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS
& PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED
PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (defining fraud as “[a]n intentional act . . . involving the use of deception that
results in a misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit”).
153. Embezzlement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Embezzlement does not involve
fraud in the receipt of the property, as the property is received legitimately but in a trustee or
fiduciary capacity. However, embezzlement involves fraud in the conversion of the property to
one’s own use. See id.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 36–48, 137–43.
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There also seems to be some confusion regarding the source of these
changes. Morales et al. link both of these changes to Joseph Wells, the founder
of the ACFE, stating that “[a]s in Wells’ writings (1997), the non-shareable
financial problem has disappeared and been replaced by an incentive or
pressure to commit fraud, while the notion of rationalization is linked with
that of attitude, thus shifting closer to the idea of individual morality.”155 The
cite is to Wells’ 1997 book, Occupational Fraud and Abuse.156 However, that does
not appear to be the source of the changes. With respect to the first factor,
Wells does not introduce the phrase “incentive or pressure.” Instead, Wells
hews closely to Cressey in this regard. He states in part, “[t]he role of the
nonsharable problem is important,”157 and he includes a discussion under the
heading “Nonsharable Problems”158 after quoting Cressey’s list of three
factors and summarizing them.159
With respect to the third factor, Wells does not mention attitude or
character per se, but he does say in his “Conclusion” section:
Our sense tells us that one model—even Cressey’s—will not fit all
situations. Plus, the study is nearly half a century old. There has been
considerable social change in the interim. And now, many antifraud
professionals believe there is a new breed of occupational offender
—one who simply lacks a conscience sufficient to overcome
temptation.160
Thus, Wells merely alludes to developments subsequent to Cressey’s work that
affect the third prong.
The origins of the changes in these two prongs likely lie elsewhere, in
research on fraud. In 1979, certified public accountant (“CPA”) Steve
Albrecht and four other researchers conducted a study for accounting firm
KPMG “to study fraud and how it could be detected.”161 They studied both

155. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 182 (citing WELLS, supra note 25). Morales et al. argue
that “SAS 99 recommends calling in fraud examiners—identified as key participants in the
antifraud effort—to work with the organizations’ administrators and auditors.” Id. at 183.
However, it appears that the reference to certified fraud examiners appears not in SAS No. 99
itself, see CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99
(AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002), but in an exhibit that Morales et al. mention, see id.
at 76 (including a paragraph that begins, “[c]ertified fraud examiners may assist the audit
committee and board of directors with aspects of the oversight process either directly or as part
of a team of internal auditors or independent auditors”). Wells is thanked in the exhibit as part
of the “Anti-Fraud Detection Subgroup.” Id. at 83.
156. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 194.
157. WELLS, supra note 25, at 11.
158. Id. This section spans more than two pages and includes subheadings on types of
non-shareable problems. See id. at 11–14. This section remains similar in a related book of his,
JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETECTION 6–9 (2004), and
subsequent editions of that book. See, e.g., JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK:
PREVENTION AND DETECTION 7–10 (5th ed. 2017).
159. WELLS, supra note 25, at 10.
160. Id. at 20.
161. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.
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convicted fraudsters and the existing literature on the subject and compiled
a list of “variables that appeared to influence or be associated with the
perpetration of fraud.”162 Their study identified 82 variables, or “red flags,”
which they classified into three categories.163
Based on this research, Albrecht et al. “concluded, similarly to Cressey,
that it was the combination of three forces that produces a fraudulent act”164:
(1) “situational pressures,” (2) “opportunities to commit fraud,”165 and
(3) “personal integrity (character).”166 Albrecht et al. found that, in fraud
cases, Cressey’s first element did not have to involve something nonshareable.167 Albrecht explains: “Rather, we concluded that situational pressures
refer to the immediate pressures that individuals experience within their
environments. . . . We concluded that the most overwhelming pressures are
usually high personal debts or financial losses.”168 This “situational pressure”
factor is similar to the AICPA’s first factor, “incentive or pressure.”169
However, the term “incentive” did not appear either in Cressey’s or Albrecht
et al.’s first factor. For that, we have to look elsewhere.
A very similar phrase shows up in a report issued by the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (known as the Treadway
Commission, after its Commissioner) in 1987.170 The Treadway Commission’s
report found that:

162. Id.
163. Id.; cf. Marshall B. Romney, W. Steve Albrecht & David J. Cherrington, Auditors and the
Detection of Fraud, 149 J. ACCT. 63, 65–68 (1980) (including a “fraud risk” questionnaire
organized into five major categories).
164. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.
165. Albrecht et al. found that opportunities to commit fraud can involve “careless internal
controls” on the part of the employer, but can also involve openings “individuals create for
themselves . . . . For example, . . . [by] modifying the computer programs.” Id.
166. W. STEVE ALBRECHT, MARSHALL B. ROMNEY, DAVID J. CHERRINGTON, I. REED PAYNE &
ALLAN V. ROE, HOW TO DETECT AND PREVENT BUSINESS FRAUD 37 (1982).
167. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.
168. Id. (emphasis added); see also Romney et al., supra note 163, at 64 (“More likely, a
situational pressure at a personal level, such as a debt or loss, would have to be combined with a
predisposition to partial dishonesty in order for the crime to take place.”). The “situational
pressure” idea is similar to Riemer’s “emergency situation.” See supra text accompanying note 123.
Albrecht et al.’s study also
dichotomized situational pressures into two groups: 1) those that encourage
individuals to commit fraud for the company rather than against the company, such
as not meeting analysts’ forecasts of revenues, gross margin or earnings, delisting
from a stock exchange or having a cash shortage and 2) those that encourage
individuals to commit fraud against organizations.
Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.
169. See supra text accompanying note 10. The rationalization aspect of the third factor was
contained in Cressey’s work. See supra text accompanying note 48.
170. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 23 (1987) [hereinafter TREADWAY REPORT],
https://www.coso.org/Documents/NCFFR.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TB-GT29]; see also
CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Pre-Clarity Statements on Auditing Standards, AU
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fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the result of certain
environmental, institutional, or individual forces and opportunities.
These forces and opportunities add pressures and incentives that
encourage individuals and companies to engage in fraudulent
financial reporting and are present to some degree in all companies.
If the right, combustible mixture of forces and opportunities is
present, fraudulent financial reporting may occur.171
This report was well-received and influential. For example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and some of its members praised the Treadway
Commission’s report.172 SAS No. 99 cites the report.173 Thus, the “incentive”
aspect of the first factor may have been drawn from that report.
As noted above, the Albrecht et al. study also shifted the third factor from
“rationalization” to “personal integrity (character).”174 That study further
“stated that it was easier for someone with lower or situational integrity to
rationalize engaging in fraudulent behavior.”175 This focus on personal
character contradicts Edwin Sutherland’s view that crime is determined by
environment rather than by personal, moral failings. However, it is consistent
with the AICPA’s statement that “[s]ome individuals possess an attitude,
character, or set of ethical values that allow them knowingly and intentionally
to commit a dishonest act.”176 Thus, Albrecht et al.’s work may have influenced
the AICPA.
A few years later, Loebbecke et al. developed their own three-factor
model. Their model:
asserts that for . . . fraud to occur, (1) the conditions of the entity must
be such that a material management fraud could be carried out;
(2) the person or persons who would commit the fraud must have a
reason or motivation for doing so; and (3) the person or persons who
§ 316.04 n.3 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2014) (referring to the commission as the
Treadway Commission).
In trying to ascertain the causes of financial reporting fraud, the Treadway Commission
interviewed numerous experts and “the Commission’s staff completed more than 20 research
projects and briefing papers, including analyses of SEC enforcement actions, pressures within
public accounting firms, AICPA self-regulatory programs, and the legal and regulatory
environment.” TREADWAY REPORT, supra, at 3.
171. TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 170, at 23 (emphasis added).
172. See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MAX BERUEFFY, THE TREADWAY COMMISSION REPORT: TWO
YEARS LATER 4–7 (1989), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1989/012689grundfest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LVV6-RBED].
173. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99,
§ 4 n.3 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002).
174. See supra text accompanying note 166.
175. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 5. Albrecht himself subsequently changed his own view on the
“character” point: “Over time and through conducting many more research projects, I personally
came to agree that Cressey’s labeling of the third element as a way to rationalize the behavior as
not being inconsistent with one’s personal code of conduct was more accurate than our label of
personal integrity.” Id.
176. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1.
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would commit the fraud must be of a character that would allow them
to knowingly commit a dishonest, criminal act.177
In 1989, Loebbecke et al. published an article summarizing that model and
applying it to the results of a survey of the audit partners of KPMG Peat
Marwick.178 In this model, the third factor is “character,” in line with Albrecht
et al.’s identification of “personal integrity” and the AICPA’s identification of
“attitudes.”179
Thus, it appears that auditing standards, including those adopted by the
AICPA in 2002, built upon various studies of the causes of fraud, including
the work by Albrecht et al. and the Treadway Commission. That research had
moved beyond Cressey’s embezzlement-related factors. It is therefore not
surprising that the fraud triangle factors in U.S. and international auditing
standards differ from Cressey’s factors.
C. WHO COINED THE “FRAUD TRIANGLE” NAME?
Even the origin of the term “fraud triangle” is disputed. Donald Cressey
did not use it in his writings.180 One source says that Cressey “reputedly used
the terminology in orally-delivered remarks,” but it does not provide a
citation.181 Morales et al. report that the AFCE stated in an email that Joseph
Wells, its founder, originated the term with a triangle graphic he used in “a
video featuring Dr. Cressey.”182 However, Steve Albrecht, who used the term
in a 1991 article,183 has argued that he was the one who labelled the three
factors the “fraud triangle,” after the “fire triangle,” when an attendee at a

177. James K. Loebbecke, Martha M. Eining & John J. Willingham, Auditors’ Experience with
Material Irregularities: Frequency, Nature, and Detectability, 9 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 1, 4 (1989)
(emphasis added). Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham argued that if any one of the three factors
is not present, material management fraud will not occur. Id. at 5 fig.1.
178. Id. at 4–5, 15–19 tbl.9.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 143, 166.
180. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 177 n.5.
181. Ryesky, supra note 7, at 144 n.154.
182. See Morales et al., supra note 19, at 177. They explain:
We contacted the ACFE by email concerning the origins of this term and received
the following response from an ACFE representative:
Dr. Cressey developed the three items, but he did not call it the Fraud
Triangle. Actually, Dr. Wells is the first person we know of to take the three
items and put [them] in a triangle format. He was working on a video
featuring Dr. Cressey in 1985, and he used a triangle graphic in the video to
illustrate the 3 factors that are present in most white-collar offenses. He began
using the triangle graphic in training programs after that time. People saw the
graphic and began referring to it as the Fraud Triangle over the years. So
although we have never undertaken an extensive review of its use, as far as we
know, that’s how it came about.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting E-mail from an ACFE representative (May 27, 2011)).
183. W. Steve Albrecht, Fraud in Government Entities: The Perpetrators and the Types of Fraud, 7
GOV’T FIN. REV. 27, 27 (1991).
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seminar Albrecht gave at a paper company suggested that the two concepts
are similar.184
The label “fraud triangle” makes more sense when applied to Albrecht’s
work than to Cressey’s. Cressey focused on embezzlement and similar trust
violations,185 while Albrecht and his co-authors studied the causes of fraud.186
Morales et al. observe that “Cressey (1953) does not stress the word ‘fraud’ in
his book; the index indicates only one page in which ‘fraudulent checks’ is
found, while ‘embezzlement’ is found on 24 pages.”187
Some sources refer to it as “Cressey’s fraud triangle”188 or say that Cressey
developed the fraud triangle to explain the causes of fraud.189 However, those
sources overlook some of the relevant history. Cressey’s study focused on
embezzlement, and his three factors underwent revisions before they were
reflected in auditing standards.190 It makes sense that the factors were given a
name that refers to fraud after they were adapted to the fraud context.

184. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 5. Albrecht adds, “I even included quotation marks around
the term because I hadn’t heard it used before.” Id. at 6.
The fire analogy may have caused some confusion. On the one hand, Albrecht wrote in 1991:
The fraud triangle is very much like the “fire triangle.” In order to have a fire, three
conditions must exist: there must be oxygen, heat and fuel. If any one of these is
removed, there will be no fire. Likewise with fraud: if either the pressure,
opportunity or rationalization is removed, fraud does not occur.
Albrecht, supra note 183, at 27. This is consistent with Cressey’s argument. See CRESSEY, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 139 (“[T]he absence of any of these [three] events will
preclude violation.”). On the other hand, Albrecht and his co-authors of the 1979 study found
that even if two elements are missing, fraud could occur if the other element is strong enough.
See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 4–5. Schuchter and Levi found in interviews that it was not necessary
for all three elements to be present, and they “strongly suggest that a distinction must be made”
between the mechanisms of the fraud triangle and the fire triangle. Schuchter & Levi, Revisited,
supra note 14, at 109.
185. See Huber, supra note 151, at 31 (arguing that the fraud triangle should be renamed the
“embezzlement triangle” and that it has no application to fraud).
186. See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that Cressey “never drew or referred to [the 3
elements] as a triangle nor used the term ‘fraud triangle.’ He also limited his discussion to
embezzlement and not to fraud in general.”).
187. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 176 (citation omitted). However, an article published
prior to Cressey’s book and discussing some of the same material was called Why Do Trusted Persons
Commit Fraud?: A Social-Psychological Study of Defalcators. See Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27.
188. See, e.g., John D. Gill, The Fraud Triangle on Trial, FRAUD MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2017, at 18, 19
(stating in the abstract, “Dr. Donald Cressey’s fraud triangle has endured”); P. Ravisankar, V.
Ravi, G. Raghava Rao & I. Bose, Detection of Financial Statement Fraud and Feature Selection Using Data
Mining Techniques, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYS., 491, 492 (2011) (“The fraud triangle is also known
as Cressey’s Triangle, or Cressey’s Fraud Triangle.”).
189. See, e.g., Rabi’u Abdullahi, Noorhayati Mansor & Muhammad Shahir Nuhu, Fraud
Triangle Theory and Fraud Diamond Theory: Understanding the Convergent and Divergent for Future
Research, 12 EUR. J. BUS. & MGMT. 30, 30 (2015) (“Cressey (1950) focused his research on the
factors that lead individuals to engage in fraudulent and unethical activity.”); Schuchter & Levi,
Revisited, supra note 14, at 107 (“This article revisits the Fraud Triangle, an explanatory
framework for financial fraud, developed by the American criminologist Donald Cressey.”).
190. See Gregory M. Trompeter, Tina D. Carpenter, Naman Desai, Keith L. Jones & Richard
A. Riley, Jr., A Synthesis of Fraud-Related Research, 32 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, supp. 1, 2013,
at 287, 291 (“Although initially developed by Cressey (1950) to explain embezzlement,
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAUD TRIANGLE TO TAX EVASION
Although the fraud triangle was developed in the context of certain types
of malfeasance, its three factors—(1) an incentive or perceived (usually
financial) pressure; (2) a perceived opportunity to cheat; and (3) rationalization
of the planned action—could also apply to other kinds of fraudulent activity.
For example, one article applied it to the Libor manipulation scandal.191 Steve
Albrecht has argued that the fraud triangle can apply to any kind of
“compromise.”192
While there are questions about how far the fraud triangle can extend,193
applying it as a lens on tax evasion is not a big stretch. First, tax evasion is
a type of fraud.194 Second, the fraud triangle often focuses on an individual
acting alone, although it has been extended to collusive activity.195 Tax
evasion need not involve collusion. For example, it can occur in the context

researchers and regulators have expanded the fraud triangle model to incorporate fraudulent
financial reporting. Consistent with this, they have broadened the language to include ‘pressure’
and ‘incentive.’”(quoting CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 99 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002))).
191. See Mark Lokanan & Satish Sharma, A Fraud Triangle Analysis of the Libor Fraud, 10 J.
FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT. 187, 187 (2018). For a description of the Libor scandal, see
James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/F7XB4V2B].
192. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 7 (“Whether it’s fraud or any other type of compromise, the
same three elements—perceived pressure, perceived opportunity and some way to rationalize the
compromise as not being inconsistent with one’s code of conduct—are always present.”).
193. For example, Donegan and Ganon argued that “even if Cressey’s findings for
embezzlers were valid, there is little evidence to support the fraud triangle as a general theory of
financial crime.” Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3. By contrast, Schucter and Levi, who
found that their cases did not all fit Cressey’s three-factor generalization, concluded that “the
Fraud Triangle does not lose its importance; rather the coercive ‘must be’ for every element has
to be replaced by ‘can be’ or ‘almost always is.’” Schuchter & Levi, Revisited, supra note 14, at 118.
Although discussing these studies in detail is outside the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that several scholars have conducted empirical studies testing the three factors in the accounting
standards as predictors of fraud. See, e.g., Lokanan & Sharma, supra note 191, at 197–98; Yung-I
Lou & Ming-Long Wang, Fraud Risk Factor of the Fraud Triangle Assessing the Likelihood of Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, J. BUS. & ECON. RSCH., Feb. 2009, at 61, 61–62; Christopher J. Skousen, Kevin
R. Smith & Charlotte J. Wright, Detecting and Predicting Financial Statement Fraud: The Effectiveness
of the Fraud Triangle and SAS No. 99, in 13 A DVANCES IN F INANCIAL E CONOMICS: C ORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 53–81 (Mark Hirschey et al. eds., 2009).
194. Emily Tuner, Chad Albrecht, Conan Albrecht & Victor Morales Rocha, A Historical View
of the Walter Anderson Tax Evasion Scheme, J. TAX’N, May 2018, at 7, 7 (“Fraud has often been
described as the process of using dishonest methods to take, or misrepresent, something of value,
often money or other resources, from another person or organization. Under this definition, tax
evasion is a particular type of fraud involving the illegal nonpayment or underpayment of tax.”
(footnote omitted)); Doreen McBarnet, Whiter than White Collar Crime: Tax, Fraud Insurance and
the Management of Stigma, 42 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 323, 323 (1991) (“Tax evasion is a term usually
reserved for non-payment of tax by means of criminal fraud or other violations of law.”).
195. Free, supra note 4, at 185. Free observes that “the major frauds of recent decades,
including Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, HealthSouth and Satyam, all illustrate that collusion is a
central element in many complex and costly frauds and financial crimes.” Id.
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of an individual self-preparing an annual tax return or lying to a tax
preparer.196
Third, the origins of the fraud triangle lie in studies of embezzlers. Tax
fraud is not identical to embezzlement, as the funds a taxpayer receives may
begin as one’s own (e.g., as payment for services or property), rather than in
trust for another party, but the two concepts share the central aspect of
conversion of funds that rightfully belong to another.197 Cressey actually used
tax evasion as the opening example in an article focusing primarily on
embezzlement.198 The fraud triangle has also evolved to encompass frauds
that are further removed from embezzlement, such as financial statement
fraud, which entails fraud on behalf of a third-party organization.
Although a handful of scholars have applied the fraud triangle to tax
fraud, generally in brief treatments,199 the legal literature on tax compliance
and evasion generally does not mention the fraud triangle. A short article in

196. Tax preparers can also collude in tax evasion, though that behavior likely occurs only
in a small part of the tax preparer market. See Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph
Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 59 (2009) (“The majority
of cash business preparers were people like B [an anonymous accountant], who suspected his
clients of tax evasion and refused to help his clients cheat, but did not investigate further or make
serious attempt to limit the cheating. A much smaller set of preparers seemed to go much farther
and actively assist tax evasion.”). Some tax preparers may simply avoid asking about things such
as “cash income, so as to permit the tax preparer to avoid the uncomfortable question of whether
to participate in what is plainly an evasion scheme.” Id. at 43.
197. One article argued that “[i]n most situations, tax evasion can be viewed as embezzlement
of government funds. The fraud triangle is particularly applicable to embezzlement because
Cressey’s original study used embezzlers as subjects.” James A. Tackett, Joe Antenucci & Fran
Wolf, A Criminological Perspective of Tax Evasion, 110 TAX NOTES 654, 655 (2006).
198. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 13 (opening the article as follows:
“Spring has returned, and with it two of the major themes of strategy in American life—how to
win a baseball pennant and how to beat the income tax collector.”).
199. See, e.g., Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory, supra note 32, at 563 (mentioning tax
evasion as an example); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1191, 1226 (2015) (discussing as an example “one of Cressey’s ‘respectable’ criminals: the tax
cheat,” but not using the term “fraud triangle”); Michael Pickhardt & Aloys Prinz, Behavioral
Dynamics of Tax Evasion—A Survey, J. ECON. PSYCH., Feb. 2014, at 1, 12 (combining “Cressey’s
(1953) ‘fraud triangle’ . . . with the Mazar et al. (2008) and Ariely (2012) approach which is
called here ‘fudge triangle’”); Grant Richardson, Grantley Taylor & Christopher S. Wright,
Corporate Profiling of Tax-Malfeasance: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Tax-Audited Australian
Firms, 12 EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 359 (2014) (applying the fraud triangle to a set of Australian
firms’ tax reporting to identify badges of tax malfeasance); Tackett et al., supra note 197
(discussing the criminology of tax evaders using the fraud triangle approach); Tuner et al., supra
note 194, at 7 (applying the fraud triangle primarily to a specific tax evasion case). None of the
authors of these articles appear to be on law faculties. Most appear to be business school or
accounting professors.
The author of this Article also authored a blog post applying to tax evasion both the
fraud triangle and the four-factor version called the fraud diamond. See generally Leandra
Lederman, Tax Evasion and the Fraud Diamond, SURLY SUBGROUP (Dec. 18, 2018), https://
surlysubgroup.com/2018/12/18/tax-evasion-and-the-fraud-diamond [https://perma.cc/F3NM
-HKMV].
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Tax Notes authored by three CPAs engages in perhaps the most comprehensive
application of the fraud triangle’s three factors to tax evasion.200
In that article, Tackett et al. briefly apply each factor to tax evasion. They
label the first factor only as pressure—not incentive—and they explain that
someone may feel financial pressure regarding the tax liability.201 They
further argue that the costs of complying with the tax laws may cause
psychological pressure and additional financial pressure.202 They briefly
discuss the second element (opportunity), using a metaphor of a department
store that functions on the honor system—implying, as discussed below,203
that lack of monitoring and sanctions for wrongdoing would soon put the
store out of business.204 With respect to the third factor (rationalization),
Tackett et al. provide three possible types of rationalizations for tax evasion.205
Each of the three elements of the fraud triangle also has additional aspects
when applied to tax evasion, and is examined, in turn, below.
A. FINANCIAL PRESSURE OR INCENTIVE
Financial pressure and incentive are two distinct possible motivators
for tax evasion. Financial pressure that can be relieved by tax evasion can
occur in a variety of contexts. One such context involves small businesses. A
business owner who employs workers is required to withhold income and
employment taxes from the employees’ paychecks and remit those taxes to
the government.206 Under the Internal Revenue Code, these taxes are “held
to be a special fund in trust for the United States.”207 It is well known that
struggling small businesses may fail to remit these “trust fund taxes.”208 This is

200. See generally Tackett et al., supra note 197 (using the fraud triangle as a focal point for
arguing that its framework helps better identify possible tax evaders).
201. Id. at 655.
202. Id. at 655–56.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 292–93 (critiquing the “honor system” metaphor).
204. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656 (discussing the “opportunity” element in two
paragraphs, referring to “a department store operat[ing] on the honor system . . . without any
supervision other than a 1 percent chance of being audited,” with almost no likelihood of
prosecution and only a small fine if caught, and positing: “How long would such a store remain
in business? The scenario is analogous to the federal income tax system.”).
205. See id.
206. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3102 (2018) (employment taxes); id. §§ 3402–3403 (income taxes).
207. Id. § 7501(a).
208. Lawrence J. Gregory, Trust Fund Taxes: Personal Liability for Small Business Owners in
Economic Decline, 25 DCBA BRIEF, Nov. 2012, at 16, 17 (“A small business may be suffering for
some time. . . . [O]wners may stop remitting employment tax withholding as a way to free up
some extra cash, paying their suppliers instead.”); see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-02-92, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE WITH EMPLOYMENT TAX REQUIREMENTS
SHOULD BE EVALUATED 1 (2002) (“When confronted with a choice between paying necessary
operating expenses or depositing employment taxes, struggling businesses may opt to pay
business expenses instead of taxes.”); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Taxpayer Compliance, Report
and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 367 (1987) (“It is tempting for
the business owner in such desperate straits to view employee tax withholdings as an interest-free
loan that will be paid back once business turns around.”); T. Keith Fogg, In Whom We Trust, 43
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closely analogous to embezzlement and similar violations of financial trust.209
The “financial pressure” element of the fraud triangle may help explain why
a business owner could operate for a long time properly remitting trust fund
taxes but begin to convert those funds for the business’s use when faced with
financial difficulties that threaten the business’s existence.
Trust fund tax enforcement is distinct and carries a special tax penalty.210
A better-known tax compliance context involves an individual preparing an
annual return.211 A taxpayer who owes tax but is facing financial pressures
could be inclined to cheat so as to reduce the amount owed or produce a
larger tax refund. This may or may not involve a tax preparer.212 The tax
liability itself can also create financial pressure.213
Even absent financial pressure, the lure of saving money provides an
incentive to cheat. For example, in the annual return-preparation context,
even if an individual faces no special external financial pressure, and even if
the tax liability itself does not create pressure (e.g., because the taxpayer is
due a tax refund), the possibility of being able to pocket extra money does
provide a financial incentive.214
In the corporate context, “[d]eclaring large profits—and even better,
large after-tax profits—is often viewed as a signal of superior performance.”215
The corporation’s owners are the direct beneficiaries of a reduction in tax

CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 361 (2010) (“Non-compliance with payment of collected taxes generally
occurs with small businesses and not with large ones. . . . The failure rate of these businesses is
high . . . . The federal tax obligation that impacts them most is the employment tax liability . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
209. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 1006
–07 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Reformed IRS] (“Often it is failing businesses that do not pay
over the taxes, essentially embezzling them as a way to forestall closing down.”).
210. See I.R.C. § 6672(a) (“Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay
over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.”).
211. Some individuals also are required to make quarterly estimated tax payments. See IRS,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2017, at 4 tbl.2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/17databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DRZ-37VF] (showing that in 2017, 22,230,026 estimated
income tax returns were filed).
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213. See Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656 (“[T]he pressure element of the fraud triangle
in tax evasion consists of the financial pressure of paying the tax along with the financial and
psychological pressure (that is, resentment) of compliance with the tax laws.”).
214. Cf. Jerry L. Mills, What to Do When the Boss Is a Tax Evader, CFO (Aug. 25, 2014), https://
www.cfo.com/tax/2014/08/boss-tax-evader [https://perma.cc/PG4X-V69L] (“The higher the
effective tax burden, the more is the temptation . . . for business owners to use aggressive methods
to lower their tax payments.”).
215. Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 75 (1994).
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liability.216 This may, in turn, translate to pressure on employees.217 In the
context of legal tax avoidance, Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala
argue, “[e]ssentially, shareholders want managers to avoid taxes, and managers,
once their incentives are sufficiently aligned, engage in tax avoidance.”218
Incentives may become aligned through incentive-based compensation.219
For example, “[t]o align incentives, it may be appropriate for the tax officer’s
salary to depend (inversely) on the effective tax rate achieved.”220
Corporate tax reduction may not stop with legal tax avoidance
strategies.
Both avoidance and evasion are rooted in the same desire—to
minimize the corporation’s total tax liability, not at all costs, but up
to the point where the marginal costs of additional efforts to reduce
the tax liability equal the marginal tax saving.
....

216. Id. at 77 (“It is in the shareholders’ interests for the managers to seek to reduce the size
and number of competing claimants (such as the revenue authority) on the corporation’s
assets.”); Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock
Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126, 126 (2009) (“[I]n order
to maximize the value of the firm, shareholders would like to minimize corporate tax payments
net of the private costs of doing so . . . .”).
217. See Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs, 89 J. PUB.
ECON. 1593, 1595 (2005) (stating, in 2005, that “[t]here [wa]s abundant evidence that the focus
of corporate tax departments has changed from that of passive compliance with the tax laws to
active, aggressive, and often arguably illegal tax planning”); id. (“Of the various measures used to
evaluate the performance of tax departments, the most often cited was the savings, or value
added, they provided: 86% cited this performance measure . . . . Of those 86%, 63% said that
this measure affected the compensation of tax department personnel.”).
The employees may also be shareholders, in which case they directly benefit from an
increase in the value of the corporation:
[T]he apparent divergence between owners and managers may not be significant
where the corporation’s managers have already become the partial owners of the
corporation. . . . The paradigm example is the privately held corporation where
there is little separation of ownership from management. But even in publicly held
corporations, it is common for the remuneration of the corporation’s managers to
be tied to their efforts to enhance the market value of the corporation through share
and option allotment schemes.
Cooper, supra note 215, at 80.
218. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Corporate Tax Shelters,
and Book—Tax Alignment, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 171 (2009).
219. Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness,
50 J. ACCT. RSCH. 775, 779 (2012) (“[R]isk‐averse managers must be properly incentivized to
undertake risky tax strategies that generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. Our
results suggest that equity risk incentives provide managers such incentives.”); see also Mihir A.
Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN.
ECON. 145, 149 (2006) (“The tremendous growth in incentive compensation during the 1990s
coincided with an increased disconnect between the profits reported to capital markets and the
profits reported to tax authorities.”); cf. Dorminey et al., Enhancing Deterrence, supra note 15, at 21
(“With financial reporting fraud, the first leg of the fraud triangle has been adjusted from
pressure to focus on motivators such as monetary incentives, bonuses, or stock options.”).
220. Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 217, at 1595.

A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE FRAUD TRIANGLE AND TAX EVASION

3/26/2021 4:05 PM

1187

. . . At some point it is quite conceivable that the corporation’s
managers will substitute evasion for further avoidance . . . .221
More generally, “managers may be prepared to engage in evasion because
they have been effectively motivated to further the shareholders’ interests, or
because they believe evasion will further their own interests.”222
Of course, corporate tax evasion, which is illegal, has costs, including
risks to employees. One such risk is possible criminal sanctions: “Corporate
managers might be implicated in such offenses as attempting to evade the
corporate tax, aiding or abetting tax evasion by the corporation, conspiring
to defraud the government through tax evasion, failing to file tax returns, or
making false statements to the revenue authority in tax returns.”223 However,
employees may disregard this risk if they believe that the likelihood that tax
fraud will result in personal or criminal liability is incredibly small.224
Another risk to employees is possible termination of employment if the
government detects the evasion.225 However, employees may believe that it is
unlikely that tax fraud will be detected.226 Moreover, “[a]lthough termination
is a serious penalty, the threat of job loss provides limited deterrence when
the individual deciding whether to commit fraud believes that her job is on
the line anyway.”227 In short, if the pressures on corporate employees and/or
financial incentives outweigh the expected costs, that dynamic can prompt tax
evasion, even if the incentive structure was not intentionally designed for that
purpose.228
Thus, incentives and pressures can both be factors in tax fraud. The
evolution of the first factor in Cressey’s research to the fraud triangle’s

221. Cooper, supra note 215, at 87–88.
222. Id. at 79–80.
223. Graeme S. Cooper, The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion in the Presence of an Income Tax on
Shareholders, 12 AKRON TAX J. 1, 8–9 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
224. Id. at 9 (stating that a corporate manager might “belie[ve] that the imposition of
personal liability is so unlikely that he may treat the prospect of punishment as negligible”);
Cooper, supra note 215, at 83 (“Administrative practices, preferring the imposition of civil fines
on the corporation to prosecution of individuals for fraud, may support this perception that
evasion carries no real threat of individual punishment.”).
225. See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1281, 1299 (2011) (stating that employees “caught [committing fraud] might lose their
job (e.g., nine out of ten managers named in SEC or Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) enforcement
actions for fraud did indeed lose their jobs)”).
226. See Cooper, supra note 215, at 96 (“It is possible that evasion will not be detected,
especially if steps are taken by the corporation to conceal its behavior; [and] some detected errors
will be ‘deniable’ in the sense that they may be successfully represented as innocent mistakes or
avoidance . . . .”); Velikonja, supra note 225, at 1299 (“[N]ot all fraud is discovered, and not all
discovered fraud is subject to an enforcement action.”).
227. Velikonja, supra note 225, at 1299–1300.
228. Cooper, supra note 215, at 79 (“[I]t may be that the shareholders have introduced
incentive structures . . . which, although implemented for more general purposes, are effective
to overcome the managers’ reluctance to become involved in evasion.”); see also Crocker &
Slemrod, supra note 217, at 1594 (“The incentives of the CFO to engage in tax evasion are
affected by the nature of her compensation arrangement.”).
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“pressure or incentive” helps expand the scope of the fraud triangle to the
various contexts in which tax evasion may occur.
B. PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY TO EVADE
The second, and most constant, fraud triangle factor is “perceived
opportunity,” sometimes just referred to as “opportunity.”229 Tackett et al.
remark that “[i]f opportunity is not present, fraud is impossible.”230 Morales
et al. stated about Cressey’s concept of opportunity, “[o]f [Cressey’s] three
conditions, the most evident (to the point where it may seem tautological) is
that of perceived opportunity: if a person commits an act, then he or she must
necessarily have perceived the possibility to do so.”231 The same holds for tax
evasion. That is, tax evasion necessarily involves some kind of perceived
opportunity to evade.
In the individual income tax context, some taxpayers have more
opportunity to evade taxes than others. For example, it is easier to successfully
evade taxes with respect to cash income than with respect to items that have a
paper trail.232 Accordingly, the opportunity to evade can be reduced through
the use of third-party reporting of taxes, such as on Form W-2 or 1099, and/or
withholding, such as occurs in the employment context.233
Withholding involves retention of a tax amount before it is ever paid to
the taxpayer, decreasing the taxpayer’s opportunity to avoid paying it over234

229. See, e.g., Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 655 (“The fraud triangle hypothesizes that
three elements are generally present when fraud occurs. Those elements are pressure,
opportunity, and rationalization.”).
230. Id.
231. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 175; cf. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle,
supra note 62, at 184 (“Contrary to findings in the literature and the previously mentioned
international fraud standards, we found that only opportunity is (perhaps tautologically)
mandatory for committing a white-collar crime, according to our interviewed offenders.”).
232. See, e.g., Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement
in the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2540 (2015) (finding evidence in a study of
Chilean VAT enforcement that a paper trail deters tax evasion); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, UserFriendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1534 (2017) (“The most obvious upside of information
reporting is the clear deterrence benefit: income that is reported to the IRS by third parties is all
but impossible for taxpayers to conceal without detection.”); Morse et al., supra note 196, at 37
(“Underpayment of tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”).
233. See generally Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement,
2020 BYU L. REV. 145 (analyzing the importance of third-party reporting).
234. The taxpayer whose taxes were withheld could still cheat on the tax return with respect
to the income subject to withholding or with respect to other items. However, the paper trail
accompanying the withheld amounts reduces the opportunity to cheat. IRS statistics show a 99
percent compliance rate with respect to items subject to information reporting and withholding
(that is, wages and salaries). IRS, PUB. 1415 (REV. 5-2016), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH:
TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 12 chart 1 (2016) [hereinafter IRS, TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MU85-JQ64]. With respect to other amounts, cash income generally faces the most
evasion. A taxpayer with only wage income could invent deductions or credits, but those involve
affirmatively including items on the return, rather than omitting an item. Taxpayers may be less
likely to affirmatively lie than to lie by omission. See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas,
Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 152, 196–97 (2017) (“As various psychological
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(but increasing the opportunity for the withholding agent to abscond with
it).235 Third-party reporting involves a paper trail that makes the payment
visible to the tax authority: Both the tax administration and the taxpayer
receive an information report containing the amount paid and other
information, including the amount of any tax withheld.236 The taxpayer could
omit from the return the amount included in the information report, but
simple document matching would likely detect it.237 That obvious transparency
should deter tax evasion. And, in fact, IRS statistics support the intuitive
notion that, as the information the IRS has about an income item decreases,
voluntary compliance also decreases:
Type of Income
“Income subject to substantial information
reporting and withholding”
“Income subject to substantial information
reporting”
“Income subject to some information
reporting”
“Income subject to little or no information
reporting”

Estimated Voluntary
Compliance Rate238
99%
95%
83%
45%

The relationships among these figures have been consistent over time.239
The IRS has therefore observed that “[f]or the individual income tax,

studies confirm, an act of omission (like failing to report income) costs individuals very little
mental energy compared to an act of commission (like robbing a bank). . . . Forcing taxpayers to
affirmatively lie on their return if they want to omit tax obligations should make them more
reluctant to do so and thereby increase compliance.” (footnotes omitted)). Items listed on the
return are also easier for the IRS to audit. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958)
(explaining, in the context of an extended statute of limitations, that “a taxpayer’s omission to
report some taxable item[] [puts] the Commissioner . . . at a special disadvantage in detecting
errors”).
235. The withheld taxes constitute “trust fund taxes” that the withholding agent could fail to
pay over. This issue is discussed in supra text accompanying notes 205–09.
236. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]. This
also simplifies compliance for the taxpayer. Thomas, supra note 232, at 1534 (“An enormous
advantage of information reporting for taxpayers is that it is essentially equivalent to
recordkeeping by the third parties that report the income.”).
237. Jim Buttonow, The New IRS “Audit”: Upfront Information-Statement Matching, H&R BLOCK
(May 17, 2017), https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/newsroom/irs/upfront-informationstatement-matching [https://perma.cc/78ZZ-UHWH].
238. See IRS, PUB. 1415 (REV. 9-2019), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 14 fig.3 (2019) [hereinafter IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES
FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7LFK753] (showing noncompliance rates).
239. Compare, e.g., IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 234, at 12
chart 1 (showing estimated noncompliance rates for the categories of income in the table above,
which translate to voluntary compliance rates of 99%, 93%, 81%, and 37%), with IRS, TAX GAP
FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 3 chart 1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_
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reporting compliance is far higher when income items are subject to
information reporting and even higher when also subject to withholding.”240
Although these IRS statistics do not prove causation, empirical studies of
the question generally have found that third-party information reporting
increases reporting of income.241 Thus, opportunity is a critical factor in tax
noncompliance, just as it is in the fraud triangle.
C. RATIONALIZATION
The fraud triangle’s third factor is “rationalization.” Cressey explained
that:
[T]he potential trust violator . . . defines the relationship between
the non-shareable problem and the illegal solution in language
which enables him to look upon trust violation (a) as essentially noncriminal, (b) as justified, or (c) as a part of a general irresponsibility
for which he is not completely accountable.242
Scholars have developed typologies of rationalizations, synthesizing decades
of prior research that, aside from Cressey’s work, took off with a 1957 article
by Gresham Sykes and David Matza on juvenile delinquents.243 Sykes and
Matza set forth what has since been termed the “Famous Five Neutralizations”
that they found offenders used to rationalize their actions.244 Since then,

gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST82-HR8E] (reflecting estimated voluntary compliance rates
of 99%, 92%, 89%, and 44%).
240. IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 238, at 13.
241. See, e.g., Todd Kumler, Eric Verhoogen & Judith A. Frías, Enlisting Employees in Improving
Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico 21–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 19385, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19385.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XLT-MLCM]
(finding that a pension reform in Mexico that linked younger workers’ pensions more closely to
reported wages and allowed those workers to monitor their reported wages reduced firms’ payroll
tax evasion with respect to younger workers); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors, 109 AM.
ECON. REV. 3031, 3052, 3069–70 (2019) (finding that the implementation of a “receipt lottery”
and online access for consumers to check reported amounts increased São Paulo, Brazil retailers’
reported revenues by at least 21 percent over four years); Junmin Wan, The Incentive to Declare
Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in China, 14 REV. DEV. ECON. 611, 617 (2010)
(finding that the introduction of a receipt lottery in certain Chinese provinces increased retailers’
sales tax payments in those provinces by 21.5–24.2 percent).
242. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 93.
243. Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22
AM. SOCIO. REV. 664, 667–69 (1957); see Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned
from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, in 32 CRIME & JUSTICE 221, 222 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2005) (“The study of offender verbalizations as ‘data’ in criminology might have originated with
Cressey’s (1953) study of embezzlers’ excuses, but it has since become associated primarily with
Gresham Sykes and David Matza’s (1957) article, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of
Delinquency.’”); id. at 223 (“[S]omewhat oddly for a theory based on juvenile delinquency,
[neutralization theory] has found its most receptive audience in studies of organizational and
white-collar crime.”).
244. Maruna & Copes, supra note 243, at 231. These five neutralizations are “denial of
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of condemners, and the
appeal to higher loyalties.” Id. They are explained in more detail below.
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other scholars have expanded on that list.245 For example, in 2003, Blake
Ashforth and Vikas Anand added three more rationalization techniques to
the list.246
In 2004, Anand et al. reduced Ashforth and Anand’s expanded list to “six
tactics that [they] believe are most commonly used in organizations” as
justifications for corrupt behavior.247 These factors are: (1) “Denial of
responsibility” (“The actors engaged in corrupt behaviors perceive that they
have no other choice than to participate in such activities.”); (2) “Denial of
injury” (“The actors are convinced that no one is harmed by their actions;
hence the actions are not really corrupt.”); (3) “Denial of victim” (“The actors
counter any blame for their actions by arguing that the violated party deserved
whatever happened.”); (4) “Social weighting” (“The actors assume two
practices that moderate the salience of corrupt behaviors: 1. Condemn the
condemner, 2. Selective social comparison.”); (5) “Appeal to higher loyalties”
(“The actors argue that their violation of norms is due to their attempt to
realize a higher-order value.”); and (6) “Metaphor of the ledger” (“The actors
rationalize that they are entitled to indulge in deviant behaviors because of
their accrued credits (time and effort) in their jobs.”).248
Rationalizations can certainly come into play in the tax context. For
example, the owner of a failing business who fails to pay over “trust fund taxes”
could rationalize that this is the only way to save the business—which will help
employees keep their jobs and will give rise to increased tax payments in the
future from both the employees and the business once it is successful again.
This is an example of an “appeal to higher loyalties” in the terminology of

245. Id. (“The subsequent expansion of the theory to different types of offenders and
offenses has led to the ‘discovery’ of several new neutralization techniques. Schönbach (1990)
devoted nearly an entire book to cataloging the different accounts that individuals offer for their
actions.”).
246. Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations,
25 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 17 (2003) (“There appear to be at least eight types of
rationalizations, five of which . . . were identified by Sykes and Matza (1957).” (citation omitted)).
247. Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth & Mahendra Joshi, Business as Usual: The Acceptance and
Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC., Nov. 2005, at 9, 11.
248. Id. at 11 tbl.1. The Anand et al. article also discusses each rationalization in more detail
under a subheading named for the rationalization. See id. at 11–14.
For more recent work discussing most of these rationalizations, along with “Claim of
Entitlement” and “Claim of Relative Acceptability/Normality,” see, for example, Todd Haugh,
The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1255–59 (2017) (discussing
“eight of the most prominent rationalizations used by white collar and corporate offenders”);
Haugh, supra note 199, at 1218–22 (exploring “eight of the most prominent rationalizations used
by white collar criminals”); and Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3143, 3165–69 (2014) (“identif[ying] eight neutralization techniques employed by white
collar criminals”).
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Anand et al.249 The owner could also rationalize that the nonpayment is only
a “loan” that will soon be repaid.250 This is an example of “denial of injury.”251
In the individual income tax context, Tackett et al. argue that “[t]he
overwhelming rationalization used in tax evasion is the lack of equity in the
tax system. The lack of equity rationalization manifests itself along three
dimensions: uneven tax burden, fiscal irresponsibility by the government, and
lack of enforcement.”252 That is, Tackett et al. argue that taxpayers may
rationalize that (1) they are making up for tax breaks that others (e.g., the
rich) get; (2) “governmental misspending or corruption justifies cheating on
tax payments”; and (3) “[t]he lack of enforcement of the tax laws places an
unfair burden on honest taxpayers.”253 These categories of rationalizations
might be paraphrased as (1) self help (creating one’s own tax break); (2) an
eye for an eye (a response to perceived governmental misspending or other
inadequacies); and (3) refusal to be a chump (because cheaters are routinely
not caught, the compliant pay more than everyone else).
The first type of rationalization, self help, focuses on the idea that others,
particularly the rich, have access to tax shelters and tax breaks that the
rationalizer does not. That rationalization may be fueled by stories about
loopholes exploited by the well-advised.254 This appears to be an example of
“social weighting” in the terminology of Anand et al.255
The second type of rationalization—the eye-for-an-eye approach, which
justifies evasion by pointing to government wastefulness or corruption—is a
form of quid pro quo. In the typology of Anand et al., this falls within “denial
of victim,” which can take the form of the classic justification, “[t]hey deserved
it.”256 This type of justification may be used by illegal tax protestors.257
The third form of rationalization is refusal to be the only “chump” who
is honest. In this regard, Tackett et al. argue:

249. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as example rationalization of this
type: “We answered to a more important cause.”).
250. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Taxpayer Compliance, supra note 208, at 367 (“It is
tempting for the business owner in such desperate straits to view employee tax withholdings as
an interest-free loan that will be paid back once business turns around.”).
251. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as example rationalization of this
type: “No one was really harmed.”).
252. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656.
253. Id.
254. For an example of this type of news story, see Emily Stewart, America’s Getting $10 Trillion
in Tax Cuts, and 20% of Them Are Going the Richest 1%, VOX (July 11, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17560704/tax-cuts-rich-san-francisco-fed.
255. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as an example rationalization:
“Others are worse than we are.”).
256. Id.
257. See Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating
Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 1518 (“Individuals who are dissatisfied with the government
and its policies are more likely to be convinced that the tax system is illegitimate than are
individuals who are satisfied with the government and its policies.”).
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Many individuals believe (correctly) that tax evasion is widespread
and goes unpunished in the vast majority of cases. The lack of
enforcement of the tax laws places an unfair burden on honest
taxpayers. Accordingly, tax evaders reason that evasion is their only
option to obtain relief from an unjust tax system.258
This also may be a form of “social weighting,”259 but it focuses on the zero-sum
game aspect of taxpaying because evading taxes raises the tax cost for
everyone else. The “chump” rationalization highlights the importance of
enforcement of the tax laws to sustaining norms of tax compliance.260 In other
words, non-enforcement “sends a signal . . . that others do not wish to enforce
the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the
social norm of compliance disappears.”261
Taxpayers may use other rationalizations, as well. For example, they may
rationalize that they need the money more than the government, that the
government will never miss the money, or that they overpaid in a previous
year and this will right that wrong. Whatever the rationalization, applying this
fraud triangle element to tax evasion is helpful in understanding the dynamics
of tax evasion.
V. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX COMPLIANCE MODELS
As noted at the beginning of this Article, the traditional economic model
of tax compliance is the deterrence model, while, more recently, the literature
has considered behavioral explanations for compliance.262 Some scholars
have suggested that these theories are in tension with each other.263 Yet, there
258. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656.
259. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1.
260. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Interplay] (synthesizing the
experimental and empirical evidence and arguing tax enforcement buttresses tax compliance
norms and can help tip a noncompliance norm in a community to a compliance norm); see also
Lederman, supra note 2, at 653 (arguing that “[a] 2009 study of individuals from the neighboring
countries of Botswana and South Africa supports the idea that enforcement efforts are more
effective where compliance norms are stronger” (footnote omitted) (citing Ronald G. Cummings,
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance:
Evidence from Surveys and an Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 447
(2009))).
261. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in
Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL
COUNTRIES 146, 151 (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & James Alm eds., 2003) (adding that “[s]uch an
outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and Italy”).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
263. See, e.g., Cummings et al., supra note 260, at 449 (“[E]xtreme . . . risk aversion would be
required to explain observed . . . compliance [under the deterrence model]. Other factors must
be at work.”); Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying Ethos
in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637, 642 (2009) (“Because the deterrence
model fails to accurately predict tax evasion levels, other forces must be influencing citizens to
comply despite the apparently overwhelming economic utility of cheating.”); Eric A. Posner, Law
and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (stating that “[a]
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay
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is no reason that deterrence and behavioral factors cannot both positively
influence tax compliance. Studies generally find that audits and audit threats
have a strong positive effect on compliance,264 and that behavioral factors
such as norms appeals265 have at least some positive effect.266 This Part argues

taxes” and advocating for a signaling model of tax compliance); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569,
577–79 (2006) (“If the economic analysis does not fully explain tax compliance, what does?
Perhaps, looking at human beings as more than mere ‘rational rats’ may provide the answer.
. . . Clearly, more experimental results would be helpful in resolving theoretical debates. In the
meantime, the best one can do . . . is to explicitly ground any proposal aimed at improving tax
administration in one of the competing views about taxpayer behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
264. See, e.g., Liucija Birskyte, Effects of Tax Auditing: Does the Deterrent Deter?, 8 RSCH. J. ECON.,
BUS. & ICT, no. 2, 2013, at 1, 5 (finding that “[a] 1% increase in federal audit rate, on the average,
increases individual income state tax collected per return by 1.74 dollars, holding other variables
constant” (emphasis added)); Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Martin B. Knudsen, Claus Thustrup
Kreiner, Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit
Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 689 (2011) (concluding in part that “[f]or selfreported income, . . . tax evasion is substantial and responds negatively to an increase in the
perceived probability of detection coming from either a prior audit or a threat-of-audit letter”);
cf. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2016, at 1035 (2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/
BUDGET-2016-APP.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA3D-HYMV] (referring to “the indirect revenue
effect of the deterrence value of [IRS tax] enforcement investments, which is estimated to be at
least three times the direct revenue impact”).
Studies generally find that penalties have a positive but smaller effect than audits on tax
payments. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 660–66 (summarizing studies).
265. See, e.g., Lucia Del Carpio, Are the Neighbors Cheating? Evidence from a Social Norm
Experiment on Property Taxes in Peru 31 (Nov. 12, 2013) (unpublished paper), https://
www.econ.ku.dk/Kalender/seminarer/18022014/Carpio.Are_the_neighbors_cheating_Nov12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ENR6-8HLA] (“Disclosing the true rate of (previous) compliance has a large
significant positive impact on compliance (20% relative to the control group). The payment
reminder, however, can explain almost half of this increase.”); STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T
OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 18
(1996), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4827/1/MPRA_paper_4827.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E7AL-6PAJ] (finding in a study of Minnesota taxpayers that “Letter 2 [the norms letter] . . . had
a moderately significant effect on the entire sample and a stronger effect within a large subgroup
of taxpayers”); Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From Theory to
Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCH. 862, 877–78 (2005) (“When taxpayers were informed about the
inconsistency between their own tax ethics and those attributed to other people, they claimed
fewer non-WRE [work-related expense] deductions compared to taxpayers who had not received
that information. However, no effect emerged for WRE claims, even though survey questions and
feedback intervention explicitly referred to these.”). But cf. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian
& Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in
Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 132 (2001) (describing “Letter2 (Join the Compliant Majority)”
and not finding a statistically significant effect in a study using the same Minnesota data as
Stephen Coleman).
266. Other behavioral factors may have an effect, as well. For example, there are several
studies examining the effect of procedural fairness or procedural justice on tax compliance. See,
e.g., Martina Hartner, Silvia Rechberger, Erich Kirchler & Alfred Schabmann, Procedural Fairness
and Tax Compliance, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 137, 149–50 (2008) (“Overall, and despite the
limitations of the findings in terms of extrapolatibility, the analysis shows a clear direct effect of
procedural justice on motivational postures with all three samples.”); Kristina Murphy, Procedural
Justice and Tax Compliance, 38 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 379, 384 (2003) (studying “why the majority
of [certain tax] scheme investors reacted in such a negative way to the ATO’s [Australian
Taxation Office] handling of the issue”); Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and
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that the fraud triangle’s framework is a useful lens for bringing together
multiple theories on tax compliance motivations.
A. THE DETERRENCE MODEL AND THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
As is well known in the tax compliance literature, under the deterrence
model of tax compliance, the taxpayer compares the cost of compliance with
the expected cost of evasion.
For example, a taxpayer who omits from income an amount
resulting in understated tax of $1000 and who faces a 1% chance of
audit that will detect the evasion and a 20% penalty in addition
to the tax if detected ($1200 in total), faces an “expected”
(probabilistic) cost of $12.267
The model thus captures the probabilistic aspect of enforcement. This
example also uses realistic audit and penalty rates for the U.S. federal income
tax system.268 In the example, the expected cost of cheating of only $12
contrasts with the much higher cost of $1,000 if the taxpayer fully complies
with the tax laws with respect to the income in question. This provides a
financial incentive to cheat.269
1. The Fraud Triangle’s “Incentive or Pressure” Prong
Recall that the first prong of the fraud triangle is incentive or pressure
(usually financial in nature).270 Incentive is a key component of deterrence,271

Justice Concerns on Tax Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 629, 639
(2002) (finding that “[n]oncompliance with regard to income reporting and tax minimization
was exclusively predicted by self-interest variables, whereas noncompliance in reporting of extra
income as well as deduction claims was additionally influenced by identification and, interacting
with identification, perceptions of justice”).
267. Lederman, supra note 2, at 642 (footnote omitted). The math is as follows:
0.01 * ($1,000 + [0.2 * $1,000]).
268. The standard U.S. federal tax penalty is 20 percent of the understated tax, on top of
the tax due. I.R.C. § 6662(a)–(b) (2018) (imposing a 20 percent penalty for such things as
negligence or substantial understatement of tax); cf. id. § 6663(a) (“If any part of any
underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to
the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable
to fraud.”). Currently, the IRS reports audit rates for U.S. individuals and corporations of less
than one percent. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2019, at 35 tbl.17a (2020),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9CE-4RJM] (stating that 0.15
percent of individual tax returns and 0.06 percent of corporate returns were examined by the
IRS for fiscal year 2018). Those rates have been declining over time. See id. at 35–43 tbl.17a. For
example, in 2010, those rates were 1.01 percent and 1.55 percent, respectively. Id. at 43 tbl.17a.
269. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 644 (“Given these low levels of audit rates and penalties,
it seems that a rational wealth-maximizing taxpayer should cheat whenever possible.”).
270. See supra text accompanying note 10.
271. Matthew McCaffrey, Incentives and the Economic Point of View: The Case of Popular Economics,
1 REV. SOC. & ECON. ISSUES, Summer 2014, at 71, 72 (“[T]he incentive theory inspired by Gary
Becker and many Chicago economists . . . introduced incentive thinking to behavior typically
considered outside the scope of economics, creating fields such as the economics of . . . crime
and punishment . . . .”).
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so it fits very well with the economic deterrence model. For example, Brian
Erard and Jonathan Feinstein start an article on tax compliance with the
statement:
In economic models of tax compliance it has traditionally been
assumed that taxpayer reporting behavior is driven primarily by the
incentives of the tax system. According to this framework, taxpayers
choose how much income to report on their tax returns by solving a
standard expected utility-maximization problem that trades off the
tax savings from underreporting true income against the risks of
audit and penalties for detected non-compliance.272
In other words, as in the calculation above,273 the possibility of paying less
to the government provides a financial incentive to evade one’s tax
obligations.274 That incentive exists regardless of whether a taxpayer also faces
financial pressures, although such pressures could increase the impulse to
cheat.275
From the perspective of the deterrence model, a context in which the
expected value of cheating is higher than the expected value of complying
fosters evasion.276 Mathematically, the incentive facing the taxpayer could be
flipped to an incentive to comply by raising the expected cost of evasion to
exceed the cost of compliance. For example, if the cost of compliance is
$1,000, as in the example, but the expected cost of evasion were $1,100—due
to the likelihood of detection and the magnitude of the penalty imposed on
those caught cheating—the taxpayer’s incentive would be to comply.277 As this
example shows, the first prong of the fraud triangle connects well with
economic analysis of the tax compliance decision.

272. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game,
25 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 (1994) (emphasis added). The article advances the importance to tax
policy of honest taxpayers who do not succumb to the financial incentive to cheat. Id. at 2.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 267–68.
274. See supra text accompanying note 228; cf. Robert R. Oliva & Roger W. Dorsey, From
Colony to Home Concrete & Supply: Is Unrecovered Basis “Gross Income”? Extending the Statute of
Limitations on Assessment from Three Years to Six Years, TAXES, Feb. 2013, at 49, 60 (2013) (applying
the fraud triangle to the context of a sale of property, and stating, “all of us, as taxpayers, are
motivated to maximize after-tax wealth”).
275. See supra Section IV.A.
276. Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1066
(2003) (“[T]he basic economic model of tax evasion, developed by Allingham and Sandmo
. . . . predicts that a taxpayer will evade taxes when the expected gains from evasion, determined
in part by the tax rate, exceed the expected value of the punishment, determined by the
probability of detection and the resulting penalty if caught.” (footnote omitted)).
277. Although, in theory, the penalty could be made large enough that a small likelihood of
detection—such as the one percent audit rate in the example—would provide an incentive to
comply, studies have found that a greater likelihood of detection is much more effective at
spurring compliance than higher penalties are. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 660–66 (summarizing
studies).
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2. The Fraud Triangle’s “Opportunity” Prong
Under the basic economic model, at the realistic audit and penalty levels
reflected in the example above,278 evasion appears much less costly than
compliance, implying that the taxpayer would always choose evasion. Thus,
the deterrence model would seem to predict zero compliance. Yet, we observe
positive and even high compliance rates in the real world. For example, the
IRS estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of 81.7 percent with legalsource income.279 Economists framed this as the tax compliance “puzzle,”280
and numerous scholars have stated based on this superficial comparison that
the deterrence model is incorrect.281
Yet, this purported compliance “puzzle” ignores (among other things)282
the issue of opportunity to evade.283 That is, simply comparing (relatively) low
278. See supra text accompanying notes 267–68.
279. IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 234, at 6–7.
280. See, e.g., James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in
Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he puzzle of tax compliance is not so much ‘Why is
there so much cheating?’ Instead, the real puzzle is ‘Why is there so little cheating?’” (emphasis
added)); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract:
The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 102 (2007) (“The puzzle of
the economic theory of tax compliance is why people pay taxes.”); J.T. Manhire, There Is No Spoon:
Reconsidering the Tax Compliance Puzzle, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 623, 630 (2015) (“[H]ow does one
explain the relatively high voluntary compliance rate given the relatively low audit rate in the
United States? This apparent difficulty is sometimes referred to as the ‘tax compliance puzzle.’”);
Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the
Shadow Economy, 30 J. ECON. PSYCH. 228, 230 (2009) (explaining “in many countries, the level of
deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance” and referring to the “puzzle
of tax compliance”).
281. See, e.g., Frey, supra note 3, at 389 (“There is compelling evidence that the deterrence
model, and therewith tax policy based on deterrence, is at best incomplete, and may even be
wrong.”); MARC LEROY, L’IMPÔT, L’ÉTAT ET LA SOCIÉTÉ: LA SOCIOLOGIE FISCALE DE LA DÉMOCRATIE
INTERVENTIONNISTE 241 (2010) (“Concernant le risque du contrôle fiscal, un fait important est
que la fréquence moyenne de vérifications est en générale faible, et donc que le respect des
obligations déclaratives devrait être plus faible qu’il n’est: cette observation contredit l’approche
par la maximisation de l’utilité.” (meaning: “With respect to tax enforcement, an important fact
is that the average audit rate generally is low, and so voluntary tax compliance should be lower
than it actually is; this observation contradicts the utility-maximization approach.”) (translation
by the author)); J. Manhire, Toward a Perspective-Dependent Theory of Audit Probability for Tax
Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629, 629 (2014) (“The classic deterrence theory model of
income tax evasion first articulated in 1972 has met significant criticism because it does not
comport with the observed rate of tax compliance.”); Posner, supra note 263, at 1782 (“A
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay
taxes.”).
282. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 650–55 (summarizing factors missing from the basic
deterrence model, including criminal penalties and the hassle of undergoing an audit).
283. See, e.g., Kleven et al., supra note 264, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion is
low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat successfully
due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Lederman, supra note 2, at 646 (“While
there is certainly room for civic commitments and respect for the law as explanations for some
compliance, the lack of opportunity for tax evasion . . . explains much tax compliance and is
consistent with the deterrence model.”); Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 697
(“An essential missing piece of this seeming puzzle is that the federal income tax law benefits
from structural mechanisms that constrain payment with respect to the major sources of income
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audit rates and penalties with (relatively) high compliance rates assumes that
taxpayers have an open opportunity to cheat with respect to all items on the
tax return—but that is not the case. There are at least two important ways in
which the government restricts the opportunity to evade taxes. One involves
a “structural system” and the other involves monitoring that is not included
in audit statistics.
A structural system is a built-in constraint that channels behavior, in
contrast with rules that require monitoring of compliance. For example, a
road can be structured to reduce speeding, such as by installing a speed
bump.284 The speed bump is a form of structural deterrent. It contrasts with
mere speed limits and posted signs, which do not structurally foster compliant
behavior.
Because structural systems impose constraints on behavior, they should
require much less monitoring for compliance than does a law or rule without
a constraining structure. In the tax law, withholding serves as a structural
system.285 This system involves a third party (typically someone who is at arm’s
length from the taxpayer), rather than a physical feature such as a speed
bump, but it still helps to constrain the taxpayer’s compliance. The IRS
estimates timely and voluntary tax payment with respect to income subject to
withholding at 99 percent.286
With respect to monitoring, some monitoring of taxpayers’ activities is
not included in audit statistics.287 That includes some IRS contacts with the

for many people, including wages and salaries.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics
of Tax Evasion, J. ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2007, at 25, 37 (“Line item by line item, there is a clear
positive correlation between the rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms
such as information reports and employer withholding.”).
284. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 696 (“[I]f the government seeks
to reduce speeding in a residential neighborhood, instead of (or in addition to) imposing fines
and ticketing speeders, it can construct roads in ways that help reduce speeding, such as making
them narrow or winding, or including speed bumps.” (footnote omitted)).
285. Id. at 697–98. This structural system involves human beings who could, in theory,
collude with the taxpayer. However, there are numerous incentives for the withholding agent to
comply rather than colluding with the taxpayer. See Lederman & Dugan, supra note 233, at 199–202.
286. See supra text accompanying note 238; IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011
–2013, supra note 238, at 14 fig.3.
287. The National Taxpayer Advocate has explained:
The IRS has several . . . types of compliance contacts with taxpayers that it does not
consider to be “real” audits. These types of contacts, which I call “unreal” audits,
include math error corrections, Automated Underreporter (AUR) (a document
matching program), identity and wage verification, and Automated Substitute for
Return (ASFR) (a non-filer program).
....
In fiscal year 2016 . . . , the IRS conducted slightly more than a million “real” audits,
resulting in an audit rate of 0.7 percent. However, during the same timeframe, the
IRS conducted approximately 8.5 million “unreal” audits. When adding these
“unreal” audit numbers to the “real” ones, the IRS’s combined coverage rate jumps
to over six percent.
Nina E. Olson, NTA Blog: “Real” vs. “Unreal” Audits and Why This Distinction Matters, TAXPAYER
ADVOC. SERV. (July 6, 2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-real-vs-unrealaudits-and-why-this-distinction-matters [https://perma.cc/Q7PM-PENQ].
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taxpayer.288 It also includes third-party information reporting. Third-party
reporting is analogous to a technology such as a speed camera or red-light
camera: It informs the government of the individual’s behavior, typically while
also informing the individual that the government is watching.289 A taxpayer
who receives $1,000 of interest or dividend or salary income generally cannot
omit it and face a mere one percent chance of detection because third-party
reporting (and possibly withholding) makes the payment transparent to the
IRS. “Information returning matching can be viewed as an invisible audit
—but it is not counted in audit rate statistics.”290
The fraud triangle’s second factor is perceived opportunity—which, in the
tax context, is perceived opportunity to evade. Although IRS matching of
information returns with taxpayer returns may not occur 100 percent of the
time, the taxpayer’s perceived opportunity to evade decreases dramatically in
the presence of third-party reporting. The IRS estimates timely and voluntary
tax payment with respect to income subject to complete third-party
information reporting (but not withholding) at a very high rate—95
percent.291 The fraud triangle’s focus on perceived opportunity helps highlight
the importance of taxpayer perception to tax noncompliance.
In applying the fraud triangle’s “opportunity” prong to tax evasion,
Tackett et al. provide the following analogy:
Suppose a department store operated on the honor system, in which
customers selected merchandise, tallied their bill, and remitted their
payment without any supervision other than a 1 percent chance of
being audited. Assume further that customers who are caught
cheating are almost never prosecuted, but merely have to pay the
accurate amount of their purchase along with a modest financial
penalty. How long would such a store remain in business? The
scenario is analogous to the federal income tax system.292
This is an interesting analogy, but it reflects the same trap that scholars
who only look at audits and penalties when evaluating the deterrence model
fall into: It is apt only for amounts not subject to third-party reporting.
Imagine if this hypothetical store also had a department with all of its
merchandise in locked cases, where a salesperson had to take the
merchandise and an invoice to a cashier to await customer payment. That
department would no doubt experience much less nonpayment, just as items
subject to third-party information reporting do.293 The locked case is a
structural system, analogous to withholding, and the accompanying person

288. Id.
289. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 696.
290. Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 975.
291. See supra text accompanying note 238; IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011
–2013, supra note 238, at 11 tbl.2.
292. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656.
293. See supra text accompanying note 238.
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essentially provides information reporting, reducing the perceived opportunity
for malfeasance.
Thus, two of the three fraud triangle factors—incentive or pressure
and perceived opportunity—align nicely with the deterrence model of tax
compliance. The third factor, rationalization, fits better with behavioral
theories of tax compliance, as discussed in the next Section.
B. BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE FRAUD
TRIANGLE’S “RATIONALIZATION” PRONG
While deterrence has been shown empirically to positively affect tax
compliance,294 it is not the only positive influence. Behavioral factors also
matter. As a simple example, risk aversion is a behavioral factor that is often
discussed in connection with the basic economic model of tax compliance.295
Risk aversion increases deterrence under the basic economic model.296 This
example shows that a behavioral element need not be considered inconsistent
with economic modeling of tax compliance.
Thus, considering a prong of the fraud triangle other than the two
discussed above in connection with the deterrence model—incentive or pressure
and perceived opportunity—does not undermine those two prongs. The fraud
triangle’s third factor, rationalization, is focused on the psychological aspects
of the violation and thus fits well with behavioral theories. This Section focuses
on two frequently discussed behavioral theories, social norms and tax morale
sourced in trust in government, to show how the rationalization prong of the
fraud triangle sheds light on them.
1. Norms of Compliance or Noncompliance
Several scholars have studied the effects on tax compliance of normative
appeals.297 Such appeals generally take the form of a letter from the tax
authority touting the community’s high level of compliance.298 As noted
294. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of audits and
audit threats); see also supra text accompanying notes 233–41 (discussing the role of third-party
reporting).
295. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 1, at 327 (including risk aversion in original
economic model of tax compliance); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 823 (1998) (including taxpayer risk aversion in a basic
economic model of compliance).
296. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 1, at 329 (“[W]hen actual income varies, the fraction
declared increases, stays constant or decreases . . . as relative risk aversion is an increasing,
constant or decreasing function of income.”).
297. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 129 (describing “Letter2: Join the
Compliant Majority”); John Hasseldine, Peggy Hite, Simon James & Marika Toumi, Persuasive
Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH.
171, 178 (2007) (reporting on a study that included in one letter both a norms-based appeal and
moral suasion); Wenzel, supra note 265, at 871 (surveying taxpayers and reporting survey results
in a letter).
298. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 129 (“The middle paragraph [of Letter 2]
stated that IRS audits show that ‘people who file tax returns report correctly and pay voluntarily
93 percent of the income taxes they owe.’ It concluded, ‘Although some taxpayers owe money
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above, some studies show that appeals to compliance norms may have at least
a modest positive effect on tax payments.299 Similarly, community norms of
noncompliance may foster noncompliance.300
The fraud triangle’s rationalization prong focuses on the psychology of
the offender. Cressey explained that “rationalization,” in the sense in which
he used the term, can “refer to a process of finding some logical excuse for
questionable behavior tendencies, for thoughts as well as acts, and for
decisions to perform an act.”301 Thus, rationalization allows the offender to
mentally justify his or her actions, so as to minimize cognitive dissonance
between a self-image as an honest person and the fraudulent action.302
A knowledge of community norms of honesty may make rationalizations
of tax evasion less effective. For example, if the taxpayer is credibly told that
most community members comply with their tax obligations, that may make
it harder for that person to justify evasion on the basis of bandwagon-type
rationalizations such as “everyone does it.” Similarly, such an information
campaign about compliance helps undermine neutralizations303 such as tax
cheating is “not really wrong.”304 By contrast, norms of noncompliance may
facilitate rationalizations that the violation is not really a crime, or not so bad,
or required so as not to be the only chump paying full freight.305 Thus,
community norms may hinder or facilitate rationalizations that help a
taxpayer justify evasion.

because of minor errors, a small number of taxpayers who deliberately cheat owe the bulk of
unpaid taxes.’”); Wenzel, supra note 265, at 874 (quoting a letter to taxpayers: “These [survey]
results indicate that we tend to think most people accept tax cheating and exaggerations in tax
deductions. However, the truth is that most people think we should be honest with our tax
statements and claim only those deductions that are allowable.”); cf. Hasseldine et al., supra note
297, at 178 (describing letter combining elements of a normative appeal and moral suasion).
299. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
300. See Lederman, Interplay, supra note 260, at 1470 (noting the possibility that “observing
others’ noncompliance might change the observer’s moral standard so that he or she might feel
less guilt in failing to comply”).
301. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 94 (footnotes omitted).
302. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
303. See Sykes & Matza, supra note 243, at 667 (“[T]he delinquent represents not a radical
opposition to law-abiding society but something more like an apologetic failure, often more
sinned against than sinning in his own eyes. We call these justifications of deviant behavior
techniques of neutralization . . . .” (emphasis added)).
304. Anand et al., supra note 247, at 12. In the language of Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi, this
rationalization is “denial of injury.” Id.; see supra note 248 (referring to other recent works that
discuss rationalizations).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 258–61 (discussing these rationalizations).
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Enforcement may also help foster compliance norms,306 perhaps because
it signals that violators are punished.307 One study’s results suggest that
enforcement may even be more effective where compliance norms are
stronger.308 The fraud triangle framework supports that idea because it is
harder to rationalize that one’s behavior is not illegal or does not matter to
the government if the government is visibly enforcing the law.
2. Taxpayer Views of Government
Some taxpayers may use claimed government failures to justify tax
noncompliance.309 For example, they may object to how tax revenues are
spent. They may refuse to pay tax, or certain taxes, until government policies
change.310 In a 1991 article, Kent Smith and Loretta Stalans listed “[t]hree
[categories] of people [who] account for the majority of noncompliance with
tax laws.”311 The category relevant here is “those who willfully engage in tax
noncompliance because they perceive that their tax dollars are not being
spent appropriately or that government authorities are not treating them or
other taxpayers appropriately.”312
As this may suggest, one way to view the taxpayer/government
relationship is as a type of contract. For example, political scientist John T.
Scholz has advanced a “contractarian” theory of tax compliance under which
taxpayers factor in the government’s provision of public goods.313 European
economists Lars Feld and Bruno Frey have referred to a “psychological tax

306. See Del Carpio, supra note 265, at 21 (finding that “[a]fter the municipal enforcement
policy begins, . . . the effect of the norms treatment relative to the payment reminder increases
almost two-fold . . . , and the difference between the two is marginally significant (p = 15%)” and
arguing that this “points to an interesting complementarity between the norms treatment and the
standard enforcement policy”).
307. See John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income Tax System, 13 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 139, 192 (2003) (arguing that, under his contractarian model of tax compliance,
“the critical function of the state’s tax enforcement power is to assure adaptive contractarians
that other citizens will meet their contractual obligations, assuring the adaptive contractarian that
he or she is not foolish in meeting these same obligations”); see also Lederman, Interplay, supra
note 260, at 1499 (arguing, based on experimental evidence, that “[e]nforcement may therefore
have the effect of deterring some people and increasing the robustness of a compliance norm for
others by minimizing their exposure to tax evasion”).
308. See Cummings et al., supra note 260, at 448 (“[W]hile compliance does increase with
enforcement effort, the effect is less in the country for which governance is less good.”);
Lederman, supra note 2, at 658–59 (arguing that the study’s results show greater normative
commitments to tax compliance in Botswana than the compared country, South Africa).
309. See supra text accompanying note 257.
310. See James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision
Institutions, and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 285 (1993).
311. Kent W. Smith & Loretta J. Stalans, Encouraging Tax Compliance with Positive Incentives: A
Conceptual Framework and Research Directions, 13 LAW & POL’Y 35, 36 (1991).
312. Id. The other two categories Smith and Stalans identified were (1) subcultures where
tax cheating is the norm, and (2) those making careless errors. Id. The first category relates to
the norms discussion above. See supra Section V.B.1. The latter category does not involve fraud,
the focus of this Article.
313. See Scholz, supra note 307, at 139–40.
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contract” between taxpayers and the government.314 Feld and Frey argued
that “a steady reduction in tax compliance need not only be interpreted as a
violation of the law, but also as taxpayers’ discontent with what they receive
for their taxes.”315
Others have different views. For example, Joshua Rosenberg has argued
that the payment of taxes and the receipt of benefits are not very linked in
most taxpayers’ minds, due to “the separation of the burdens of tax from the
benefits of government.”316 Moreover,
the benefits of taxes (that is, the receipt of government services)
seem both small and unrelated to our actual tax payments. As the
benefits of tax fade from consciousness, and as their burdens grow
in prominence, we begin to perceive the taxes themselves as little
more than undeserved and unduly painful punishments.317
Studies generally have not found a significant effect on tax payments of letters
sent to taxpayers that focus on the public goods the government provides.318
While a decline in tax compliance could have many causes, including a
reduction in the audit rate,319 taxpayer claims that they are protesting
government wrongs could seem to suggest that “good government” measures
would foster compliance. Feld and Frey argue that “[t]he[] bonds between
taxpayers and the state represent the core of individual tax morale, and thus
positively affect tax compliance.”320 Appropriate treatment of the citizenry
should certainly be a government priority, but whether it results in increased
314. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 106 (“In the psychological tax contract, punishment still
plays a role in order to provide deterrence. But the satisfaction of taxpayers with what they get
from the other contract party, that is, the government, mainly influences their tax morale.”).
315. Id. at 107.
316. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can
Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 171 (1996).
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance:
Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 43–44, 58 (2012) (finding that a
letter to Israeli corporations explaining “how tax dollars were allocated,” providing “[r]easons
for paying taxes,” and highlighting the societal harm from not paying, resulted in a small but
statistically significant effect in the direction of noncompliance with a Value Added Tax (VAT));
Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 128–32 (finding no statistically significant effects of a
“Support Valuable Services” letter); Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy
Strategy? Evidence from a Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOVERNANCE 235, 240,
249–51 (2004) (finding an insignificant effect on timely filing and payment in Trimbach,
Switzerland, of a letter stating, “[i]f the taxpayers did not contribute their share, our commune
with its 6226 inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes you help keep Trimbach attractive
for its inhabitants.”). But cf. Michael Chirico, Robert P. Inman, Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald
& Holger Sieg, An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies to Increase Property Tax Compliance:
Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love, 30 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 129, 146–47 & tbl.5 (2016) (finding
that a letter describing public services had a statistically significant effect at p < .05 on the
subgroup of single-property owners).
319. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 693 (concluding, based on a synthesis of studies, that “at
low audit rates such as those in the United States, the evidence suggests that increasing the audit
rate would increase overall tax compliance” (emphasis omitted)).
320. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 103.
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tax compliance is an empirical question. Different reforms may have different
effects. For example, previous work found that there is some evidence that
procedural fairness on the part of the tax collector increases tax payments,321
but that there was no evidence that increased service by the tax collector did
so.322
Frey and other scholars have argued that “tax morale” is central to tax
compliance.323 This term is generally used to refer to all intrinsic motivations
to pay taxes.324 It contrasts with deterrence, which involves the extrinsic
motivators of audits and penalties.325 Frey has pointed to trust in government
as the principal source of tax morale, arguing that:
Tax morale must be put in the general context of the relationship
between citizen and the state: At the one extreme, there are
exploitative governments ruling their people in an authoritarian
or even dictatorial way. . . . At the other extreme, there are
participatory governments in which the taxpayers as citizens can
themselves determine for what purposes the revenues should be
used.326
While deterrence and behavioral theories of tax compliance can coexist,327 some have argued that deterrence, with its focus on extrinsic
motivators, may reduce voluntary inclinations to comply, even to the point of
increasing noncompliance.328 In this vein, Frey has argued in part that
321. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 996–1004 (synthesizing then-existing
studies); see sources cited supra note 266 (citing additional studies).
322. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 992–96 (synthesizing then-existing
studies).
323. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying note 326. Frey’s
claims are strong and are countered in Lederman, supra note 2, at 642–55.
324. See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated,
3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2002) (“[T]he existence of an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes
. . . has sometimes been called ‘tax morale.’”); Frey, supra note 3, at 389 (arguing “that intrinsic
motivation in the form of ‘tax morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax paying
behaviour”).
325. See Torgler, supra note 318, at 236 (“When monitoring and penalties for
noncompliance are intensified, individuals notice that extrinsic motivation has increased . . . .”).
326. Frey, supra note 3, at 389–90 (emphasis omitted); see also Bruno S. Frey, Punishment
—and Beyond, 5 CONTEMP. ECON. 90, 92 (2011) [hereinafter Frey, Punishment—and Beyond] (“An
unfair, inconsiderate way of treating taxpayers—punishing honest taxpayers by error—tends to
undermine this tax morale.”); Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional
Cooperation, 35 J. COMPAR. ECON. 136, 144 (2007) (“If taxpayers think they are in a better position
to monitor and control politicians, their willingness to cooperate and pay taxes increases.
Therefore, a higher degree of satisfaction with a country’s democratic institution should lead to
higher tax morale.”); Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 103 (“For that contract to be upheld,
incentives such as rewards or punishment need to be provided, but loyalties and emotional ties
that go well beyond transactional exchanges must be considered as well. These bonds between
taxpayers and the state represent the core of individual tax morale, and thus positively affect tax
compliance.”).
327. See supra notes 262–66 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying notes 294–96.
328. See, e.g., Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 104 (“Positive (rewards) or negative incentives
(deterrence) play a role, but it cannot be taken for granted that they induce tax compliance
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“deterrence imposed by the tax authority may crowd out individuals’ intrinsic
willingness to conform to tax laws.”329 Similarly, Feld and Frey argued that
“[t]wo opposite cases of treating taxpayers can be distinguished:
(1) respectful treatment supporting, and possibly raising, tax morale; and
(2) authoritarian treatment undermining tax morale.”330 However, there
is little evidence that deterrence has a crowding-out effect that reduces
voluntary compliance.331 Instead, there is strong evidence that deterrence,
particularly the threat of audit, is very effective at increasing tax payments.332
The lens of the fraud triangle suggests that a view that the government
or tax system is unjust or inequitable may be part of the rationalization prong
for some people. That is, it may allow people to justify not complying with tax
obligations. Joshua Rosenberg has made an argument along these lines:
At least a part of the reason we do not comply more fully with the
tax laws is that we believe either taxes specifically, or government in
general, is unfair. Also true, however, is exactly the opposite: an
important reason we believe tax laws are unfair is that we do not comply more
fully with those laws.333
Rosenberg explains that tax evaders try to avoid the uncomfortable
cognitive dissonance that would arise from thinking of oneself as both a lawabiding citizen and as stealing from the government: “In order to allow
themselves to maintain a positive sense of self, the ‘rational’ part of their
minds develops an understanding of what they are doing and why they are
doing it that allows them to perceive their tax evasion as consistent with being
a good, honest citizen.”334 That “understanding” could take the form of a
rationalization formulated any number of ways:
Whether this rationalization takes the form of “knowing” that the tax
system is unfair, or “knowing” that the government is bad and
misguided, is less important than the fact that, regardless of how
individuals explain their tax evasion behavior to themselves and
others, that explanation is likely to be some ex post rationalization

because they may also crowd out tax morale.”); Frey, Punishment—and Beyond, supra note 326, at
92 (“The net effect of using punishment in an effort to establish legal behavior is
counterproductive if the relative price effect of the punishment is smaller than the crowding-out
effect.”); cf. Frey & Feld, supra note 280, at 107 (“The feeling of being controlled in a negative
way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an
honorable taxpayer and, as a consequence, tax morale will fall.”).
329. Frey, supra note 3, at 391 (emphasis omitted).
330. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 107.
331. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 655–62 (synthesizing studies and reaching this conclusion).
332. See supra note 264 (citing sources).
333. Rosenberg, supra note 316, at 199 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). He adds, “It
is doubtful that anyone would ever consciously acknowledge that she thinks taxes are unfair
because (rather than so) she cheats on her own taxes, but an individual’s lack of awareness of such
a reverse-intuitive causal link does not mean that no such link exists.” Id.
334. Id. at 200–01.
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rather than some guiding vision that motivates the behavior of tax
evasion.335
If Rosenberg is right that, at least for some taxpayers, claimed inequitable
behavior by the government is simply a rationalization for evading taxes,
better behavior by the government likely would not forestall such evasion.
Without an easy scapegoat, evasion might be harder to justify, but some
taxpayers might find an alternate rationalization, such as “everyone is doing
it” or “they’ll never miss the money.” Better government behavior also likely
would not affect committed evaders.336 In terms of the fraud triangle, these
may be the people who auditing standards describe as “possess[ing] an
attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them knowingly and
intentionally to commit a dishonest act.”337
The normative implication of this analysis is that it does not make sense
to make good-government measures the sole or principal means of
attempting to improve tax compliance. Certainly the government should treat
people fairly as a matter of principle. Procedural justice may foster tax
compliance, as well.338 However, given taxpayers’ financial incentive to pocket
tax dollars and the presence of evasion opportunities, the government should
not only treat taxpayers fairly, it should also recognize the importance of both
structural constraints on evasion and enforcement. Such an approach accords
not just with intuition but also with the theoretical framework provided by the
fraud triangle. Empirically, limiting the opportunity to evade and increasing
the likelihood that evasion will be detected have very positive effects on tax
compliance.339
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a significant literature on the fraud triangle, particularly in
accounting journals. The AICPA also adopted a fraud triangle-based
approach in what was then called SAS No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit.” Some scholars have criticized the fraud triangle
as having been inappropriately extended beyond Donald Cressey’s initial
focus on embezzlers and similar trust violators. It is true that the fraud triangle
has evolved over the years, and that, perhaps due to its origin in offender335. Id. at 201.
336. Taxpayers may be conceptualized in three main categories: those who are always honest,
those who will always try to cheat, and a vast majority whose behavior can be influenced. See Jon
S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D. Perkins, Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics,
ACCT. REV., Jan. 2003, at 39, 40 (referring to “honest taxpayers, susceptible taxpayers, and
evaders”); cf. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44
CONN. L. REV. 675, 694 (2012) (referring to “determined evaders”).
337. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 321–27.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 238–39 (reporting IRS voluntary compliance
estimates, which increase as the IRS receives more information about the transaction); see supra
note 264 and accompanying text (citing research on the effectiveness of audits at decreasing tax
evasion).
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focused work, it does not focus much on society’s role in crime. However,
Cressey’s factors were not simply adopted wholesale by the AICPA. Work
by Steve Albrecht, the Treadway Commission, and others appears to have
informed the development of the slightly different factors that are included
in U.S. and international auditing standards.
Although the fraud triangle has been well studied, it has largely been
overlooked by tax law professors and only rarely applied to tax evasion. Yet, it
provides a useful lens when considering the tax evasion decision from an
offender perspective. Most notably, the fraud triangle supports the idea
that perceived opportunity is a critical—though not the only—factor in tax
evasion. The fraud triangle also supports the importance of the deterrence
model while still recognizing the importance of behavioral factors on the tax
evasion decision.
Generally speaking, the triangle’s first two factors—incentive or pressure
and perceived opportunity—may be thought of as in line with the deterrence
model, while the third factor—rationalization—accords with behavioral
theories of compliance. While increasing compliance norms may help limit
convenient rationalizations for cheating (and likely more so than goodgovernment measures) structural systems constrain the opportunity to evade.
In addition, enforcement actions reduce the incentive and opportunity to
cheat, while buttressing compliance norms. The fraud triangle thus provides
a useful frame for showing how traditional economic and behavioral theories
can work together. The usefulness of the fraud triangle to the understanding
of tax evasion also underscores the value of accounting literature and
criminology to the study of tax compliance and evasion.

